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Abbreviations and terminology 
i) Income Tax Act (the act) - The Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as amended) 
 
ii) New Companies Act – Companies Act 71 of 2008 (as amended) 
 
iii) Old Companies Act – Companies Act 61 of 1973 (as amended)   
 
iv) SARS – South African Revenue Service, as defined in s1 of the Income 
Tax Act. 
 
v) SATC – South African Tax Cases Reports (Lexis Nexis) 
 
All references to ‘section’ or ‘the act’ pertains to the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 (as amended), unless otherwise stated. 
All references to ‘Labat’ pertain t  Comissioner for South African Revenue 
Service v Labat Africa Ltd 74 SATC 1 (SCA), unless otherwise stated. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
The use of shares as a method of payment is regarded as a well-
established and everyday part of commercial practice. It provides a 
popular alternative to companies as it requires no actual cash flows. The 
only cost being the subsequent watering down of existing shareholders 
rights.  
Apart from financing services and assets, it also provides a form of relief 
for companies facing financial distress or cash flow problems. The 
company can reach a compromise with creditors, in terms of which 
existing debt is turned into equity through the issue of shares.1 
Further examples of share-based payments include:2 i) Issuing shares as 
consideration for the acquisition of a going concern. ii) In the discharge of 
third party debt. iii) Payment to employees for reaching predetermined 
goals. iv) As part of a share incentive scheme to top management. This 
provides employees with a direct interest in the company and thus 
diminishes agency concerns. 
Despite the wide application of share-based payments in commerce, the 
tax implications thereof have always been subject to uncertainty.3 Case 
law on the question whether share-based payments could be regarded as 
expenditure was contradictory at best.4 Consequently in 2004 the issue 
was addressed partly by the inclusion of s24B as discussed hereunder at 
2.1.2.5  
                                            
1 See s155(3)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 which expressly mentions this 
possibility as part of business rescue proceedings.  
2TE Brincker Taxation Principles of interest and other financing transactions 7 ed (2010) 
at P-2. 
3 Ibid.  
4 See ITC 1783 66 SATC 373; ITC 1801 68 SATC 57; ITC 1822 69 SATC 200 and 
Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Labat Africa Ltd 72 SATC 75.  
5 Section 22(1) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 32 of 2004. 
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Section 24B expressly provided that shares issued in the acquisition of 
assets/trading stock would be regarded as expenditure.6 SARS 
emphasised that by not regarding it as expenditure, this would create a 
hindrance to company formations and other forms of share financing.7 
Although s24B provides some certainty, its scope is restricted to the 
acquisition of assets. As such uncertainty still existed as to shares issued 
as consideration in circumstances where assets are not acquired, for 
example for services rendered.  
The question was brought to a decisive end with the Labat case.8 The 
supreme court of appeal holding that share-based payments would not be 
regarded as ‘expenditure actually incurred’. 
As can be expected given the commercial expediency of share-based 
payments, the finding of Harms AP has consequently given rise to much 
debate on the meaning of expenditure actually incurred and whether 
share-based payments meets the mark. 
1.2 Aim of study 
The aim of this study is to determine what ‘expenditure actually incurred’ 
means in the South African tax context. Once this has been established, 
the researcher will consider the appropriateness of this attributed meaning 
by engaging with possible arguments for and against the meaning 
attributed. The study further considers specific phenomena in the sphere 
of share-based payments such as set-off and recoupment.  
1.3 General overview of shares and share-issue.9  
The scope of the study is restricted to the question of what ‘expenditure 
actually incurred’ as contained in the act means. It is however necessary 
to provide a summary as to the nature of shares and the issue thereof by a 
company. Reason being that the most contentious issue in dealing with 
‘expenditure’ and as such most of the articles and cases on the question 
                                            
6 Section 24B(1)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
7 SARS: Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2004 at 56. 
8 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Labat Africa Ltd 74 SATC 1 (SCA). 
9 For purposes of the discussion both the old Companies Act 61 of 1973, as well as the 
new Companies Act 71 of 2008 will be addressed in so far as it is relevant to give context 
to the question of ‘expenditure’ as considered. 
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deal with share-based payments. What follows is a brief outline on all 
share-based aspects relevant to our discussion.  
 
1.3.1 The legal nature of shares 
The Act defines a ‘share’ as ‘one of the units into which proprietary interest 
in a profit company is divided’.10 Ownership of assets resides in the 
company and the shareholder is not entitled by its shareholding to 
ownership thereof.11 Van Zyl J states in Cooper v Boyes:  
‘The gist thereof is that a share represents an interest in a company, 
which interest consists of a complex of personal rights which may, as 
an incorporeal movable entity, be negated or otherwise disposed of. It is 
certainly not a consumable article, such as money, even though a 
money value can be placed on it.’12   
In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and another v Ocean Commodities 
Inc and others, the following is stated: 
‘A share in a company consists of a bundle, or conglomerate, of 
personal rights entitling the holder thereof to a certain interest in the 
company, its assets and dividends.’13 
Shares are not regarded as property until they are issued, at which stage 
they acquire value in the hands of the shareholder and become moveable 
property.14 However it can never be said that the shares constitute 
property or assets in the hands of the issuing company, neither before nor 
after issue.15 
Under the old act shares could be issued with or without a par value, being 
a ‘nominal’ label of value that attached to the share.16 If shares had such a 
par value, they could not be issued at less than that value.17 Cassim et al 
                                            
10 Section 1 of 71 of 2008.  
11 Farouk HI Cassim (ed), Maleka F Cassim & Rehana Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 213. 
12 Cooper v Boyes 1994 (4) SA 521 (C) at 535. 
13 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and another v Ocean Commodities Inc and others 
1983 (1) SA 276 (A) at 288. 
14 Lowry v Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd 1940 2 All ER 545 at 565. 
15 R de Swardt ‘Do share-based payments made for the procurement of services qualify as 
expenditure actually incurred?’ (2008) De Jure 475 at 483.   
16 Section 52(2) of Act 61 of 1973. 
17 Section 81 of Act 61 of 1973. 
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comments that the par value often tended to be misleading as to the true 
value of the shares and as such the new act has done away with this 
distinction between par and no-par shares.18   
1.3.2 Share issue agreement 
Shares can be acquired either by purchase from another existing 
shareholder or through share issue by the company itself.19 In the latter 
case the company and subscriber enter into a subscription agreement 
based on the essentialia of an offer for subscription by the company, 
application by the subscriber and allocation of shares to the subscriber.20 
The contract is completed once shares are paid up and consequently 
issued. 
Payment can take the form of cash or consideration in kind.21 It is 
important to note that the contract is not one of barter as no property is 
transferred, but rather a conglomerate of personal rights is created i.e. the 
share.22 It is also not a contract of sale, as the company does not agree to 
pay a monetary amount nor does it transfer any property to the 
subscriber.23  
1.3.3 Consideration for shares 
If shares are issued at an inadequate consideration, shareholders run the 
risk that their shareholding becomes watered down.24 To address this risk 
the concept of capital maintenance existed under the old act. This entailed 
that ‘par shares’ could not be issued at less than par, and ‘no-par shares’ 
at no less than the average issue price of shares already issued.25 Given 
the arbitrary nature of the par value in recent times, the new companies 
act removed this requirement. Existing par value shares, issued before 1 
                                            
18 Cassim et al op cit note 11 at 215 read together with s35(2) of Act 71 of 2008. 
19 Celliers, Benade, Henning et al Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) at 247. 
20 MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham et al Commentary on the Companies Act   
(2002) at 241. 
21 Section 93(2) of Act 61 of 1973, s40(1)(a) of Act 71 of 2008. 
22 Blackman et al op cit note 20 at 255 para 5. 
23 De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg (1992) at 313. 
24 Cassim et al op cit note 11 at 226. 
25 Sections 81 and 82 of Act 61 of 1973. 
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May 2011 remains as before, but no new par value shares can be 
authorised.26  
In terms of the s40 of the new act, shares can only be issued for adequate 
consideration as determined by the board.27 Courts in the past have been 
reluctant to interfere, unless the consideration was obviously inadequate 
or evidence of fraud or an absence of bona fide valuation existed.28 This is 
carried through to the act which stipulates that the adequacy of  
consideration can only be challenged on the grounds as contained in s76 
as read with s77(2). These entail the general fiduciary duties of a director 
such as avoiding conflict of interest, acting in good faith and the best 
interest of the company and applying due care, skill and diligence.  
Section 40(4) provides that once consideration as discussed above is 
received, the shares are regarded as fully paid up and are issued by the 
company. Both acts further provide that no shares may be issued unless 
fully paid up.29 A share issue agreement will thus be void unless the 
consideration in cash or kind is received on or before the issue of the 
shares.30  
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The researcher intends to follow a historic research method. The following 
sources will be considered in reaching the aims of the study:  
i) South African Legislation 
ii) South African Case Law 
iii) English Case Law 
iv) The opinions of South African authors both in the academic and 
professional sphere. These include journals, handbooks, newsletters and 
thesis on the topic.    
                                            
26 Item 6(2) of schedule 5 of Act 71 of 2008 as read with reg 31(2) of the Companies 
regulations GNR 351 GG 34239 of 26 April 2011. 
27 Act 71 of 2008. 
28 Ooregum Gold Mining Co of India v Roper and Wallroth 1892 AC 236 (HL) at 136-7. 
29 Section 92(1) of Act 61 of 1973 and s40(4) of Act 71 of 2008.  
30 Etkind and others v Hicor Trading Ltd and another 1998 JOL 1861 (W). 
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1.5 Structure 
1.5.1 Chapter 2: ‘Expenditure actually incurred’: Areas of application and the 
continued relevance of the phrase in connection with share-based payments  
The chapter firstly considers the application field of the phrase 
‘expenditure actually incurred’ as found in the act. Secondly the effect that 
ss 24B (as amended) and 11(lA) has had on the relevance of the phrase is 
considered, where after a conclusion is reached as regards the continued 
relevance of the phrase in our current tax system. 
1.5.2 Chapter 3: Expenditure 
The chapter focusses on the meaning of ‘expenditure’ as found in the 
phrase ‘expenditure actually incurred’. We firstly consider the word 
‘expenditure’ in a general sense by looking at the dictionary meaning 
attributed and its interpretation. Secondly we consider both South African 
and English case law on expenditure. Thirdly we look at secondary 
sources on the meaning of expenditure. Finally we consider if ‘loss’ ads an 
extra dimension to the concept of ‘expenditure and losses actually 
incurred’.    
1.5.3 Chapter 4: Actually incurred 
In this chapter we con ider what ‘actually incurred’ ads to the enquiry of 
what constitutes expenditure actually incurred. We start by considering the 
leading South African cases in which ‘actually incurred’ has been 
considered. There after we look at the impact if any, that Labat has had on 
this requirement.   
 
1.5.4 Chapter 5: Commentary on Labat and the real meaning of ‘expenditure 
actually incurred’  
In this chapter we consider the leading arguments raised in connection 
with Labat and share-based payments in general as it pertains to 
‘expenditure actually incurred’.  
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1.5.5 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The final chapter provides a brief summary of the conclusions reached in 
the foregoing chapters. A meaning is attributed to ‘expenditure actually 
incurred’ post Labat and a conclusion is reached on whether share-based 
payments conform thereto. We finally consider practical alternatives going 
forward.     
1.5.6 Chapter 7: Bibliography  
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Chapter 2 ‘Expenditure actually incurred’: Areas of 
application and the continued relevance of the phrase in 
connection with share-based payments 
2.1 Introduction 
In terms of s11(a) of the act, commonly referred to as the general 
deduction formula, a taxpayer can only deduct from his/her income 
expenditure and losses actually incurred as part of his/her trade, in the 
production of income, provided that the expenditure and losses are not of 
a capital nature. (Emphasis added) 
Until recently, the question of what constitutes ‘expenditure actually 
incurred’, was one that evoked relatively little debate. It was traditionally 
regarded only as a question of timing, namely at what stage could it be 
said that expenditure was actually incurred, rather than if ‘expenditure’ 
was actually incurred.31 What was required was an unconditional 
obligation incurred in the relevant year of assessment and if present that 
was the end of the story.32 
The settled approach was however disregarded in 2011 and a new 
dimension was added to the question. Harms AP stating as follows:  
‘Although the court stated the principle to be deducted from these 
judgements correctly the problem is that they did not deal with the 
meaning of ‘expenditure’ but with the question when the expenditure 
was actually incurred… They held that it was incurred during the tax 
year in which the obligation arose.... It was never an issue in the instant 
case as to when liability arose…. The question the court should have 
posed was whether the issuing of shares by a company amounts to 
‘expenditure’ and not whether the undertaking to issue shares amounts 
to an obligation.33 
 
The court held that not only is an unconditional obligation in the year of 
assessment required, but that the obligation should also constitute 
                                            
31 See Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR 1936 CPD 241, 8 SATC 13; 
Concentra (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1942 CPD 509, 12 SATC 95; Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR 1975 
(1) SA 665 (A) and Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI 1986 (3) SA 549 (A). 
32 Nasionale Pers supra note 31. 
33 Labat supra note 8 para 7-8. 
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‘expenditure’. Thus we can conclude that two requirements flow form the 
phrase, namely (i) ‘expenditure’ (ii) actually incurred. 
What follows in this chapter is firstly a discussion on the relevance of this 
phrase in South African tax law. Thereafter follows a detailed analysis of 
the two requirements as interpreted in case law, both from a South African 
and United Kingdom perspective.34 Finally we look at the Labat case and 
its implications going forward.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
34 For purposes of the study the question of what constitutes expenditure in general will 
be addressed, but due to the nature of case law on the topic a larger emphasis is placed 
on share-based payments. 
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2.2 Relevance of the phrase ‘expenditure actually incurred’ 
The first task is to determine the areas of the act in which ‘expenditure 
actually incurred’ (hereafter “the phrase”) find application. Thereafter the 
researcher will look at the working of s24B, s24BA and s40CA of the act 
and its implications on the relevance of the study. There will also be a brief 
discussion on s11(lA) as read with s8B. 
The phrase finds application in three areas of the act. Firstly it forms part 
of the general deduction formula as contained in s11(a) of the Act. As 
such no general deduction is available against income without expenditure 
or losses being incurred. 
Secondly the phrase finds its way into the capital gains regime through 
para 20 of the Eight Schedule. When calculating capital gains on the sale 
of an asset the base cost of such an asset is deductible in the calculation. 
In defining ‘base cost’ para20(1) provides as follows:  
‘…the base cost of an asset acquired by a person is the sum of (a) the 
expenditure actually incurred in respect of the cost of acquisition or 
creation of that asset.’  
 
Further reference to the phrase is found in subsecs (b) and (c) with regard 
to valuation and related acquisition costs respectively. Consequently no 
base cost can be deducted from proceeds in terms of part II of schedule 
eight without expenditure being incurred. 
Lastly the phrase finds application in a variety of subsecs of s11.35 These 
include among others, capital allowances which are only available if 
expenditure has been incurred in the acquisition of the relevant asset.36 
From what is said above it is clear that the phrase forms a central part of 
deduction regime as found in the act.  
 
 
                                            
35 See ss 11(d) ‘repairs’, 11(g) ‘improvements to fixed property’, 11(gA) 
‘patents/inventions’, 11(gB) ‘registration of design/trademark/patent’, 11(gC) ‘acquisition 
of invention/patent/design/copyright’, 11(gD) ‘gambling/petroleum/telecommunication 
licence’, 11A ‘expenditure prior to commencement’, 11D(2) ‘research and development’. 
36 See Labat supra note 8 which dealt with 11(gA).  
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2.3 The role of s24B/s24BA/s40CA.        
As already mentioned the question as to what constitutes ‘expenditure 
actually incurred’ is particularly significant in the sphere of share-based 
payments.37 For this reason provisions that explicitly deal with share-
based payments impact the relevance of the inquiry.38 
Section 24B was inserted in 2004 under the new capital gains regime.39 It 
provided that where an ‘asset’, as defined in para 1 of schedule 8, was 
acquired through share issue, certain deeming provisions would apply. 
Firstly the issuer would be regarded to have acquired the asset at the 
lower of market value of either the shares issued or asset acquired.40 
Secondly the seller would be regarded as having received proceeds equal 
to the market value of the shares upon issue.41 
The section applied to all assets (excluding trading stock) acquired on or 
after 1 October 2001 and from 24 January 2005 in any other case. As 
such it was not applicable in Labat, as on the facts the relevant asset was 
already acquired in the 1999 year of assessment. 
The explanatory memorandum to s24B states that prior to the enactment 
of the section, share issues were not regarded as ‘expenditure actually 
incurred’ in terms of judicial precedent.42 This caused a deterrent to 
company formations and asset acquisition by way of share-financing. The 
memo states that this was not in line with international tax norms and 
consequently s24B was enacted to address this hindrance.  
In 2012 the commissioner issued a revised memorandum stating that 
s24B was insufficient as it generally assumes asset-for-share transactions 
take place on a value-for-value basis.43 As such schemes of uneven value 
                                            
37 Labat’s Case supra note 8; ITC 1783 66 SATC 373; ITC 1801 68 SATC 57 and 
Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Labat Africa Ltd 72 SATC 75, all 
dealt with the question whether share-based payments could be regarded as expenditure 
actually incurred.      
38 Sections 42, 45, 47 of the new companies act which provide for corporate rollover relief 
is not addressed as part of the study. 
39 Inserted by s22(1) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 32 of 2004. 
40 Section 24B(1)(a). 
41 Section 24B(1)(b). 
42 SARS: Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2004 at 56. 
43 SARS: Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2012 at 39. 
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changes are possible under s24B without the appropriate tax being levied. 
Further the ‘value shifting’ definition in par 1 of the eight schedule was 
inefficient as it only addressed the case of connected persons.   
 
Section 24B has consequently undergone a complete makeover in terms 
of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act.44 As of 1 January 2013, s24B now 
deals exclusively with share for share issues. The previous s24B as we 
know it has been moved to s40CA with a number of amendments. 
Section 40CA(1) now reads:  
‘Subject to section 24B, if a company acquires any asset as defined in 
para 1 of the eight schedule, from any person in exchange for – (a) 
shares issued by that company, that company must be deemed to have 
actually incurred an amount of expenditure in respect of acquisition of 
that asset which is equal to the market value of the shares immediately 
after the acquisition; or (b) any amount of debt issued… equal to that 
amount of debt.’ (own emphasis) 
 
 
Thus some marked differences from the old s24B exist. Firstly the value to 
be placed on the asset as acquired by the issuing company is no longer 
the lower of the two market values, but rather the market value of the 
shares. Secondly s40CA now expressly makes provision for the situation 
where a company acquires an asset through the issue of debt.  
The scheme of value shifting has now been directly addressed in terms of 
s24BA of the act. It provides that where a company acquires assets for 
consideration in shares issued, and the consideration differs from the 
consideration that would have applied had the company issued the shares 
in terms of a transaction between independent persons in an arm’s length 
transaction, the following deeming provisions apply:45 
subsec(3)(a)Where market value of the asset exceeds that of shares: (i) 
The excess be deemed to be a capital gain in the hands of the issuing 
company. (ii) Acquirer of shares acquires shares as… (aa) capital asset, 
                                            
44 Taxation Laws Amendment Act No 22 of 2012. 
45 Section 24BA(4) excludes intra group transactions. 
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then excess deducted from base cost of asset; (bb) trading stock, then 
excess deducted from amount taken into account in terms of ss 11(a), 
22(1) or 22(2). 
subsec(3)(b) Where the market value of the shares exceeds that of 
assets: (i) The excess be deemed a dividend in specie as defined in s64D, 
paid by company on date of issue. (ii) No adjustment to cost of shares as 
acquired by seller.  
The effect of s24BA is that any value mismatch in an asset-for share 
transaction will be taxed in the hands of the person receiving the benefit, 
regardless of whether or not they are connected persons. Section 24BA 
comes into effect on 1 January 2013 and applies to all transactions 
entered on or after that date.46   
 
The scope of s24B as amended has not altered in its effect on the 
relevance of our study. Section 40CA now expressly covers cases of 
share issue for acquisition of assets as defined in para 1 of the eight 
schedule.  
Asset: ‘Includes – (a) property of whatever nature, whether moveable or 
immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, excluding any currency… (b) A 
right or interest of whatever nature to or in such property.’     
 
It follows that share-based payments are now statutorily deemed 
‘expenditure actually incurred’ when acquiring assets as defined. The 
researcher contends that the study nevertheless remains relevant as 
s40CA does not deal with share-based payments as consideration for 
services rendered or the discharge of pre-existing trade debt.47 It further 
provides a general insight into the meaning of ‘expenditure’.48  
                                            
46 Section 52(2) of act 22 of 2012. 
47 See K Burt ‘Issuing shares as consideration – Expenditure Actually incurred?’ (2004) 18 Tax 
Planning 133 at 136; De Swardt op cit note 15 at 478. 
48 See E C Jansen van Rensburg ‘Some thoughts on the meaning of “expenditure” in the 
Income Tax Act’ (2013) 1 TSAR 58 at 59; Editorial ‘No-Brainer’ (2011) The Taxpayer 181 
at 182.  
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Bortz, argues that ‘services rendered’ could be regarded as an asset by 
relying on s92 of the old Companies act49:  
‘It is submitted that that since companies are allowed to allot shares to 
employees, the service that they received, makes those shares fully 
paid up. In other words, the company receives payment in the form of 
services from the employee. Thus, those services are clearly an asset 
in that the company attaches value to such services’50 (emphasis 
added) 
 
The researcher contends that this is incorrect. Firstly this takes no 
cognisance of the situation where a company issues shares as 
consideration for services rendered by a third party. ‘Services rendered’ 
implies a service already received, which prior to payment would constitute 
a liability rather than an asset. It is only where payment is made prior to 
services being rendered, that there could be argued that the right to 
receive services (namely the personal right to performance, against the 
third party in terms of the service contract) could be regarded as an 
asset.51  
Secondly where the company itself renders services through its 
employees, the subsequent invoicing of the client upon services being 
rendered gives rise to a debtor which constitutes an asset in the books of 
the company, not the potential services to be rendered by employees.  
Employees render services in terms of a service contract with employer 
and the subsequent salary is deductible under s11 as an expense. This 
undoubtedly does not constitute the acquisition of an asset as defined in 
para 1. Why should the salary for services rendered, suddenly become an 
asset because it is paid in shares rather than cash?  On the reasoning of 
Bortz all salaries should now be regarded as an asset as the company 
places a value thereon. This cannot be intended. 
                                            
49 Jeremy Bortz Do share-based payments constitute expenditure, for tax purposes, in 
order to facilitate a deduction? (Diploma in Income Tax Law dissertation, University of 
Cape Town, 2006).   
50 Ibid at 20. 
51 See Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 69 where she addresses the nature of an 
asset.  
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Finally the simple fact that value is received for the issue of shares, does 
not make the consideration received an asset as defined. This is evident 
where shares are issued for cash. There is no doubting that the company 
places value on the cash, but that in itself does not make it an asset in 
terms of para 1. 
2.4 Section 11(lA) as read with s8B.52 
The receiver of revenue states in the explanatory memorandum to 11(lA) 
that ‘An employer that directly issues shares to employees is not entitled 
to any tax deduction for the shares issued because the issue of shares is 
not viewed as a cost ‘actually incurred’.53 (emphasis added) 
Given the discouraging effect the above tax treatment has on the transfer 
of free or discounted shares, and in effect long-term, broad-based 
employee empowerment, SARS consequently inserted s11(lA) and s8B.        
Under s11(lA) provision is made for the deduction of the market value of 
any qualifying equity shares, as defined in s8B, issued to an employee, 
less any consideration received from the employee. Provided, that the 
amount deductible in a single year is restricted to R10 000 per employee 
per year. The excess can be carried forward to the following year.  
‘Qualifying equity share’ as defined in s8B(3) means an equity share 
acquired in terms of a broad based employee share plan, and provided 
that the total value of the equity shares so acquired in that year and the 
preceding four years do not exceed R50 000.54 “Broad-based employee 
share plan’ is further defined in s8B(3), but is not considered in our study. 
Thus 11(lA) provides an express deduction for shares issued, given the 
requirements of s8B is met. The area of application is however narrowly 
defined and the quantum of deduction is restricted to 10 000 rand a year 
per employee. 
 
                                            
52 Inserted by Revenue Law  Act 32 of 2004 with effect from 26 October 2004. Section 
11(lA) was last amended by 18(1)(e) of Revenue Laws Amendment act no 60 of 2008 
which is deemed to be applicable to shares issued on or after 21 February 2008.      
53 SARS Explanatory Memorandum op cit note 7 at 6.  
54 Definition as substituted by s.10(1)(d) of Revenue Laws Amendment act no 60 of 2008. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion it is clear that the question as to the meaning of ‘expenditure 
actually incurred’ remains relevant. Where s24B and 11(lA) find no 
application, the question whether shares-based payments constitute 
expenditure would need to be answered with reference to case law. The 
study would further provide insight into the meaning of the term 
‘expenditure’ as it applies to tax law today.  
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Chapter 3 Expenditure 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed above the phrase ‘expenditure and losses actually incurred’ 
finds application in a variety of sections. Traditionally it was interpreted as 
a whole, constituting one requirement. Recent case law has started to 
illustrate a distinct second element to ‘actually incurred’ namely 
‘expenditure’. The mere incurrence of an obligation is not sufficient, as 
Harms states in Labat:  
‘…the term ‘obligation or ‘liability’ and expenditure are not synonyms… 
the liability or obligation must be discharged by means of 
expenditure…’55     
The question therefore is, what does ‘expenditure’ mean in the context of 
South African taxation?  
The term is not defined in the act and in the absence of a definition, courts 
can avail themselves of a dictionary in determining the ordinary meaning 
of the word or expression.56 In using a dictionary, one should however 
always remember that it does not provide meaning-in-context. It often 
provides more than one possible meaning and it is up to the ‘interpreter’ to 
decide on the most appropriate meaning in context.57  
Du Plessis warns against an ‘excessive peering at the language without 
sufficient attention to the contextual scene’ which in turn leads to an 
unreflective use of a dictionary.58 
The Oxford dictionary defines ‘expenditure’ as follows: ‘The action of 
spending funds; an amount of money spent; the use of energy, time, or 
other resources.’59 
The ‘Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse taal (HAT)’ defines ‘onkoste’ as: 
‘Geld vir iets betaal; uitgawes’. ‘Uitgawes’ in turn is defined as ‘Geldbedrag 
wat uitgegee word; koste’.60 
                                            
55 Labat supra note 8 para 8.  
56 Lourens Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 200. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid, see also Jaga v Donges NO 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) para 664. 
59 C Soanes & A Stevenson (eds) Oxford Dictionary of English 2 ed (2009). 
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Goldblatt J in applying the above mentioned definition states:  
‘Expenditure’ in its ordinary dictionary meaning is the spending of 
money or its equivalent eg time or labour and a resultant diminution of 
the assets of the person incurring such expenditure. (emphasis 
added)61 
The court thus reads an impoverishment test into the definition, requiring a 
diminution of assets. The researcher doubts whether this is necessarily 
implied by the above definition. The Oxford definition makes express 
provision for expenditure by way of time, energy or other resources. This 
would include services rendered (energy/time expended by company) and 
thus be a case where assets are not diminished, but expenditure is 
nevertheless incurred.  
Goldblatt J correctly refers to the the spending of time or labour as 
constituting expenditure, but then concludes that a diminution of assets is 
required.  
‘Asset’ as considered, was not defined by the court in either ITC 1783 or 
Labat.62 ‘Asset’ has such a variety of meanings, that before a meaning can 
be established, the scope of the act as a whole needs to be considered.63 
Generally speaking, assets are regarded as a person’s patrimonial rights, 
namely a subjective right to patrimonial objects which that person holds.64 
It is the claim a person has to legal objects with material or economic 
value against other persons.65 These legal objects include corporeal 
objects such as land; incorporeal objects such as patent rights and finally 
personal rights such as the right to performance in terms of a service 
contract.66   
                                                                                                                       
60 P C Schoonees, C J Swanepoel & S J Du Toit et al Handwoordeboek van die 
Afrikaanse Taal 1 ed (1979).  
61 ITC 1783 op cit note 4 para 7.2. 
62 See Jansen Van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 73. The author concludes that what would 
be required on the reading of Labat, is a diminution of assets in the legal sense.  
63 Benoni, Brakpan and Springs Board of Executors, Building Society and Trust Co Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue 1921 TPD 170 at 173. 
64 C G Van Der Merwe ‘Things’ LAWSA vol 27 First Reissue (2001) para 195. 
65 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 69; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) at 9. 
66 L Du Plessis Inleiding tot die Reg 3 ed (2003) AT 150; AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar 
Inleiding tot die sakereg 5ed (2007) at 8. 
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Time or labour would not be regarded as an asset as defined above.67 As 
such, no diminution can occur by expending time or labour. One wonders 
how the conclusion is then made that assets need to be diminished 
despite the judges view that time or labour expended would be regarded 
as expenditure. Notwithstanding, the court of appeal also required a 
movement of assets.        
 
Harms AP in considering the test of Goldblatt J states: 
‘In the context of the Act it would also include the disbursement of other 
assets with a monetary value. Expenditure, accordingly, requires a 
diminution (even if only temporary) or at the very least movement of 
assets of the person who expends. This does not mea  that the 
taxpayer will, at the end of the day, be poorer because the value of the 
counter-performance may be the same or even more than the value 
expended.’68 (Emphasis added)      
 
From the above it is clear that expenditure does not have to be in money, 
but can take the form of any asset with monetary value attached thereto. 
The court also removed the ‘diminution’ requirement and rather required at 
the least a movement of assets.  
The court using rather clumsy wording required further that a liability be 
discharged by way of expenditure for it to constitute ‘expenditure actually 
incurred’.69 Arguably it was in actual fact trying to convey that one should 
look at the content of the performance extinguishing the liability.70 The 
liability should be extinguished by way of a movement or diminution of 
assets, for it to constitute expenditure. 
What follows is a look at South African case law on the meaning of 
‘expenditure’ where after cases from the United Kingdom will be 
considered. Finally we look at secondary sources on the topic. 
                                            
67 See also Smith v SIR 1968 (2) SA 480 (A) where the court held that the taxpayer’s wits 
and labour which produced his income were not property. 
68 Labat supra note 8 para 12. 
69 Ibid para 8. 
70 See Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 63; C Cilliers ‘The Labat decision and the 
interaction between “expenditure” and the “actually incurred” requirement’ (2011) The 
Taxpayer 226 at 228. 
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3.2 South African Cases dealing with ‘expenditure’. 
3.2.1 ITC 70371 
This was the first South African case dealing with share-based payments 
and its deductibility under the then s11(2)(a).72 The company sought to 
deduct an amount, paid by way of share issue, to a firm of consultants for 
advisory and technical assistance with the erection of a new factory. The 
main argument on behalf of the commissioner was that the expenditure 
was capital in nature and thus not deductible.  
The court accepted shares issued as constituting payment for purposes of 
expenditure without further ado. Although the case does not deal 
expressly with the meaning of expenditure, it nevertheless illustrates a 
acceptance of share-based payments by our courts. 
 
3.2.2 ITC 178373    
In casu the taxpayer acquired part of the business of the seller including a 
licence agreement by way of share-based payment. The value of the 
assets was predetermined and it was agreed that payment would take 
place by way of share issue at par plus premium. The taxpayer posed to 
deduct the value of the ‘licence agreement’ acquired (valued at R5280 
000) in terms of either 11(a) or 11(gA) of the act. 
On appeal to the tax court the question was whether the taxpayer had 
incurred expenditure as envisaged in 11(a) or 11(gA). The court in 
considering the ordinary dictionary meaning comes to the conclusion that 
a diminution of assets is required.74 Goldblatt J, in relying on Silke, finds 
that the issuing of shares does not diminish the company’s assets.75  
                                            
71 17 SATC 208. 
72 Income Tax act 31 of 1941. 
73 ITC 1783 supra note 4. 
74 Ibid para 7 2. 
75 Ibid. 
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The passage form Silke works with the concept of hypothetical settlement, 
namely what would be required of the company to hypothetically settle the 
obligation as it stands.76  
For example: An obligation incurred which clearly states a settlement price 
in cash, would hypothetically require a cash amount (diminution of assets) 
to settle. The approach of Silke states that regardless of the way in which 
it is actually settled this would be regarded as ‘expenditure’. Where the 
agreement expressly states that settlement occurs by way of share 
issue/service rendering, there is no hypothetical possibility of a diminution 
of assets and as such no ‘expenditure’. It should be noted that the authors 
gave no authority for their stated position. 
The court consequently disallowed the deduction as the incurrence of an 
obligation to issue shares and the subsequent issuing thereof does not 
diminish the assets of the company.  
 
3.2.3 ITC 180177   
The taxpayer acquired the rights to a trademark, purchase price being 
valued at R44 462 000. The purchase agreement provided that 
consideration would be given by way of a share issue. The shares were 
consequently issued by the taxpayer, whereupon he claimed a deduction 
in terms of 11(gA). The commissioner disallowed it, claiming that the issue 
of shares by the taxpayer did not constitute expenditure actually incurred 
as compliance with its contractual obligation, did not require the taxpayer 
to expend any monies or assets. 
The court holding in favour of the taxpayer, firstly referred to the principles 
laid down in Edgars Stores.78 Namely that all that was required was the 
incurrence of an unconditional obligation. It was not necessary for it to be 
discharged in the year of assessment.  
                                            
76 A P de Koker & R C Williams ‘Silke on South African Income Tax’ (Subscription-based 
service only) [online] Available at http://www.lexisnexis.co.za. Accessed on 12 April 2013 
para 7.4. 
77 ITC 1801 supra note 4. 
78 Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR 1988 (3) SA 876 (A). 
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But this was not in dispute, the real question being whether an obligation 
to issue shares could be regarded as ‘expenditure’. Namely could it be 
said that this was an obligation incurred which would lead to the 
hypothetical diminution of assets. Counsel for the commissioner relied on 
Goldblatt J in ITC 1783 and his approval of SIlke for support. Jooste AJ 
rejecting as follows:  
‘The decision in case 10999 (ITC 1783) is in our view, with respect, clearly 
wrong and not a reflection of the law. Tax issues should not unnecessarily 
complicate or frustrate ordinary commercial transactions.’79       
 
Here the case becomes a bit more complicated. It is not completely clear 
whether Jooste AJ merely requires an incurrence of an obligation, 
regardless of the hypothetical settlement requirements, or whether he 
concedes that an obligation which requires the diminution of assets should 
be incurred, but that the issue of shares constitutes such a diminishment. 
Burt is of the opinion that ITC 1801 rejected the notion that ‘expenditure’ 
necessarily involves the diminution of assets.80 He finds support for his 
contention in the courts reference to Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR.81 
Jooste AJ finding on the basis of Lace that the issue of shares by an 
company in discharging purchase price, constitutes consideration given. 
It is not clear how this necessarily implies that no diminishment is required. 
It merely regards the issue of shares as ‘consideration given’ which as will 
be discussed hereunder, does not necessarily equate to expenditure. 
Burt’s argument does find some support in para 20 where the court 
addresses the passage from Silke:  
‘”A perusal of the passage makes it clear no expenditure has been 
incurred where the quid pro quo consist of an issue of shares…has not 
lost or parted with any assets”… Mr Derksen, in my view correctly argued 
that this ignores the fact that the requirement is that the company should 
have incurred an unconditional legal obligation and that, if it has done so, 
the deductibility requirement is met…expenditure actually incurred is not 
dependent upon making payment… The contention also does not take 
                                            
79 ITC 1801 supra note 4 para 24. 
80 K Burt ‘Issuing shares as consideration II – ITC 1801 vs ITC 1783’ (2006) 20 Tax Planning 
47 at 48. 
81 9 SATC 349. 
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cognisance of weighty English and South African authority…’82 (emphasis 
added)           
The court also referred with approval to the following extract of Ger: 
 ‘…he (Goldblatt J) confused the concept of incurral of expenditure with 
the settlement thereof….the fact that it chose to settle this expenditure in 
shares should not change this reality.’83 
 
The alternative view on ITC 1801 is found in De Swardt’s article.84 He 
contends that the case is not authority for the position as argued by Burt, 
but rather that the issue of shares for no consideration, constitutes a 
diminution of assets. He contends that support for this view is found in the 
following extract from the case:  
‘Where the obligation has been incurred, the expenditure becomes 
deductible if it also complies with the other requirements for deductibility 
laid down by the section…’85 (His emphasis) 
 
Further support is found in the courts approval of Osborne, in which the 
court held that where share-based payments are made, the issuer is 
giving up the right (asset) which it would otherwise have had to claim cash 
form the allottee and thus a diminution of assets occur.86  
The extract from Ger as approved by Jooste, also confirms this view: ‘…by 
issuing shares in lieu of paying in cash for the licence, it could be said that 
the taxpayer was indeed reducing its assets…’87 
As can be seen from the above, it is not clear what basis the court used 
for coming to its conclusion. It could even be said that the court approved 
of both the above mentioned contentions made by the authors. Despite 
this, ITC 1801 however provides clear authority that shares issued as 
consideration constitutes expenditure actually incurred.  
 
                                            
82 ITC 1801 supra note 4 para 20.  
83 Ibid para 22, see B Gerr ‘Income Tax: The problem of paying with shares’ (2004) De 
Rebus 61 at 62. 
84 R de Swardt op cit note 15 at 482. 
85 ITC 1801 supra note 4 para 7. 
86 Ibid paras 11 and 24. 
87 Gerr op cit note 83 at 62. 
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3.2.4 ITC 182288 
The taxpayer in casu acquired a licence to access data form an 
international news service. Consideration would be provided in part by the 
issue of shares and part by the issue of debt by the purchaser. The 
purchaser consequently credited the seller on loan account and issued 
shares to extinguish the balance. Taxpayer claiming the full amount as a 
deduction in terms of s11(a). The court in considering the deduction relied 
on ITC 1801, stating: ‘As to whether issue of shares constituted 
expenditure (i) That this question must be regarded as settled in the light 
of the comprehensive and most persuasive judgement of Jooste AJ in ITC 
1801…’89   
 
3.2.5 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Labat Africa Ltd90 
On appeal the North Gauteng High court confirmed the court a quo’s 
finding in ITC 1801, specifically emphasising para 20 of that case as 
quoted above. This case seems to provide more support for the view as 
contended by Burt above, namely that a diminution of assets is not 
required. The court specifically states that even if the diminution test 
(dictionary meaning) would be accepted as correct, share-based 
payments would still be regarded as expenditure. This view is supported 
by applying a different construction to the transaction, in terms of which 
shares are first issued and paid whereupon the cash so received is used 
to pay the asset. The court contends that there exists no difference 
between such a construction and that which took place in casu.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
88 ITC 1822 supra note 4. 
89 Ibid para 21. 
90 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Labat Africa Ltd supra note 4.  
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3.2.6 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Labat Africa Ltd91 
Final word on the issue came in 2011 when a full bench of the appeal 
court found by word of Harms AP that share-based payments do not 
constitute expenditure. 
The court considering ITC 1801 stated that the wrong question was posed 
in determining whether expenditure was incurred. The tax court addressed 
the timing question in its reference to Edgars Stores, namely ‘when was it 
incurred’ rather than ‘is it expenditure’. The court thus explicitly brings to 
an end any speculation on the question as to whether a diminution of 
assets is required, by stating that the mere incurrence of an obligation is 
not sufficient. Harms states:  
‘...the terms “obligation”, “liability” and “expenditure” are not 
synonyms…the liability or obligation must be discharged by means of 
expenditure…’92  
The court finds support for this in the following statement by Botha JA in 
Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR: 
 ‘…”any expenditure actually incurred” meant all expenditure for which a 
liability has been incurred during the year, whether the liability has been 
discharged during the year or not…’93    
The researcher respectfully agrees with Marais, that this passage does not 
state that a liability should be discharged by means of expenditure, but 
rather that the liability and expenditure arise simultaneously. 94  
It is consequently argued that the court placed the cart before the horse by 
requiring that a liability should be discharged by expenditure, as 
expenditure precedes a liability.95 It is the expenditure that gives rise to a 
liability in the first place. 
This problem arises as a result of the rather awkward wording applied in 
Labat. It is contended that one should rephrase Harms’ requirement as 
follows to convey his true intention: ‘The liability or obligation should 
                                            
91 Labat supra note 8. 
92 Ibid para 8. 
93 Caltex Oil supra note 31 at 12. 
94 A Marais ‘The (In)Equity of Labat’ 2013 The Taxpayer 4 at 7.  
95 TS Emslie & DM Davis Income Tax Cases and Materials 3 ed (2011) at 347. 
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require settlement by means of a diminution or movement of assets for the 
incurrence of the said liability to constitute expenditure actually incurred.’96  
On this reading the liability and expenditure come into existence 
simultaneously on incurrence of an obligation which would hypothetically 
require a diminution/movement of assets. This is in accordance with the 
phrase form Silke as approved by Goldblatt J in ITC 1783 and 
subsequently followed by Harms AP. 
Burger agrees with this view in stating that a liability for something that is 
not an ‘expense’ cannot constitute expenditure.97 Burt however disagrees. 
He feels that Caltex provides support for holding that the mere incurrence 
of an obligation in terms of which performance with a monetary value is 
due is sufficient. He states: ‘The incurrence of an obligation as a fact 
cannot be affected by the means by which that obligation is discharged.’98  
What is clear from Caltex is that a link exists between the incurrence of the 
liability and expenditure. This is supported by the majority of authors as 
well as the dicta of Harms AP. As De Swardt correctly points out:  
‘What has to be determined is the extent and the specifics of the legal 
obligation on the company…and whether such a liability that has been 
actually incurred would constitute an ‘expenditure.’99         
 
The appeal court continues in stating that the tax court posed to address 
the correct question in principle with reference to English case law and the 
question whether shares issued as consideration for assets could be 
regarded as consideration given. The problem however was that Harms 
AP did not regard English case law as case in point to the present enquiry 
as to the meaning of expenditure.  
Given the acts absence of a definition for expenditure, the court availed 
itself to the dictionary meaning, applying a rather strict literal approach in 
its interpretation. The court in modifying the impoverishment test of ITC 
                                            
96 Cilliers op cit note 70 at 227. 
97 Burger The Tax Tax Deductibility of Share-Based Payments made as Consideration for 
Services Rendered (MCom (Tax) dissertation, UP, 2005) at 39. 
98 Burt op cit note 47 at 133. 
99 De Swardt op cit note 15 at 482.  
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1783, came to the conclusion that a movement of assets would be 
required at the very least. 
As to the question whether the issue of shares constituted such a 
movement of assets, the court found in the negative, relying on ITC 1783 
among others.100 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
100 See ITC 1783 supra note 4; Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 
(2) SA 584 (A) and Estate Furman v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1962 (3) SA 517 
(A). All these cases confirm that a company’s assets are not diminished by the allotment 
of shares. 
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3.3 English Case law 
The tax court in Labat referred with approval to the English case law cited 
by counsel, stating that it was ‘sound and represents a correct statement 
of law’.101 This position was subsequently confirmed in the high court.102 
Harms AP, on appeal however found that these cases had no bearing on 
the meaning of expenditure as used in s11(a), as it did not address 
‘expenditure’ expressly  but rather ‘consideration given’.103   
It is contended that English authority should be given further consideration 
in the light of approval by both aforementioned courts and learned 
authors.104 Jansen van Rensburg however emphasises that it should be 
considered against the backdrop of a differing corporate tax base applied 
in the United Kingdom.105 An English company is taxed on its ‘profits’.106 
As such they do not apply a general deduction formula as used in South 
Africa, but rather allow all costs relevant in profit calculation as a 
deduction, unless otherwise prohibited.  Consequently the term 
‘expenditure’ is not explicitly addressed in case law. Should this however 
be a deterrent to the application of the principles as enunciated in English 
case law, as contended by Harms AP?  
What follows is an analysis of the four leading English cases on 
‘expenditure’ as referred to in South African case law. The intention being 
to determine the applicability and contributory value of these cases to the 
question aforementioned, namely the meaning of ‘expenditure’ as used in 
the act.107 
 
 
 
                                            
101 ITC 1801 supra note 4 para 24. 
102 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Labat Africa Ltd 72 SATC 75. 
103 Labat supra note 8. 
104 DM ‘Paying for goods or services by issuing shares’ (2004) The Taxpayer 86-87. 
105 Jansen van Rensburg supra note 48 at 67. 
106 Section 35 of the Corporation Tax Act, 2009 (chapter 4). 
107 Section 11(a), 11(gA), 20(1)(a) of the Eight Schedule of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962.  
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3.3.1 Lowry v Consolidated African Selections Trust Ltd108  
In casu the taxpayer issued shares to employees at par value. He claimed 
the difference between the market value and par as a deduction, arguing 
that the shares were issued at a discount in respect of services rendered.   
In phrasing the question Viscount Caldecote L.C. states:   
‘…I ask whether the issue of these shares in the manner adopted 
involved the respondent in any “distributions or expenses”…” 
 
The majority dismissed the deduction stating: 
‘respondents had neither transferred money or money’s worth to the 
members of the staff, and therefore the sum in question could not be 
treated as a disbursement or an expense which could be deducted in 
computing their profits.’ 
 
Viscount Caldecote L.C. states further: 
‘Its capital was intact after the issue of the shares: not a penny was in 
fact disbursed or expended. Its trading receipts were not diminished, 
nor do I think it is a right view of the facts to say that the respondent 
gave away money’s worth to its own pecuniary detriment’109 
 
The minority held that the company had disbursed the difference as 
claimed.  
Although this case addresses ‘expenditure’, it provides little guidance as to 
our problem, as it deals with the question whether a lost premium 
constitutes expenditure and not whether the issue of shares in itself is 
‘expenditure’.110 Meyerowitz concurs with the majority in stating that the 
premium is a notional expenditure and not deductible, but states that on 
the facts the case is not precedent for holding that the issue of shares 
could not constitute expenditure.111 
                                            
108 Lowry v Consolidated African Selections Trust Ltd 1940 2 All ER 545 (HL). 
109 Ibid at 657 
110 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 68. 
111 DM op cit note 104 at 87. 
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Jansen van Rensburg however contends the opposite, namely that the 
majority statement is wide enough to include the issue of shares at par.112 
The case was never considered by any of our courts and as such the true 
import remains uncertain. 
3.3.2 Osborne v Steel Barrel Co Ltd113 
In this case the taxpayer acquired trading stock for £10 000 cash and 
£30 000 fully paid up shares. The question before the court was what 
cost should have been allowed as a deduction for trading stock. The 
crown argued that as the shares cost the company nothing, the cost of 
the stock should be restricted to £10 000. Lord Greene MR rejecting 
this held:  
‘The cases relied on in its support were Inland Revenue Comrs v 
Blott and Lowry v Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd, neither 
of which, in our view, has any bearing on the point. The argument 
really rests on a misconception as to what happens when a 
company issues shares credited as fully paid for a consideration 
other than cash passing from the allottee. A company, therefore, 
when, in pursuance of such a transaction, it agrees to credit the 
shares as fully paid, is giving up what it would otherwise have had – 
namely, the right to call on the allottee for payment of the par value 
in cash. A company cannot issue £1,000 nominal worth of shares 
for stock of the market value of £500, since shares cannot be 
issued at a discount.… the consideration moving from the company 
must be at least equal in value to the par value of the shares, and 
must be based on an honest estimate by directors of the value of 
the assets acquired.”114 
 
The court thus held that the ‘right forgone’ in issuing shares as fully paid 
up constitutes a cost to the taxpayer to the amount of the par value of the 
shares so issued.115 Costs incurred in the acquisition of trading stock is 
taken into account in calculating taxable ‘profits’ for purposes of the United 
                                            
112 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 69; Bortz op cit note 49 at 12. 
113 Osborne v Steel Barrel Co Ltd (1942) 1 All ER 634 (CA). 
114 Ibid at 637-638. 
115 This arguments merits are addressed in full in chapter 5.3 of this dissertation. 
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Kingdom Corporate tax act.116 As such ‘cost’ could provide a point of 
comparison for interpreting ‘expenditure’ in the act.117  
Schoon argues that given a difference in historical context the ‘right 
forgone’ argument would no longer be suitable to South African tax law.118 
The reason being that capital maintenance regime as applicable in 
Osborne’s case is no longer applied in South Africa. Capital maintenance 
entails that a company cannot issue par value shares at less than par, 
subject to certain conditions.119 The new Companies Act removes the 
distinction between par and non-par value shares and requires in s40 that 
adequate consideration should be received for shares issued. 120 As such 
there is no obligation on the company to issue shares at par. 
He contends that given the extinguishing of this obligation or ‘right’ to 
issue at par, the ‘right forgone’ argument as held in Osborne no longer has 
footing as the directors have no ‘right’ or obligation to demand par. He 
argues that it would lead to incongruity in that a party would be able to 
deduct the value of the shares, which might possibly have no relation to 
the value of the asset actually acquired.121 
The researcher contends that more cognisance should have been taken of 
s40(3) as read with s76 and s77(2) of the new Companies Act. Section 76 
emphasises director duties including the duty to avoid conflict of interest, 
to act in good faith, for a proper purpose and in the best interest of the 
company. It is suggested that a determination of ‘inadequate 
consideration’ can be challenged on the basis that one of these duties has 
been breached.122 As such it provides an indirect method of maintaining 
capital. 
                                            
116 Craddock v Zevo Finance Co Ltd 1944 1 All ER 566 (CA) at 570. 
117 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 67. 
118 AD Schoon The tax effect of shares-for-future-services (unpublished LLM theses, UP, 
2011) at 42.  
119 Section 81 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provided that par value shares could only 
be issued at a discount if a court resolution was obtained and a special resolution was 
passed. 
120 Section 35(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
121 Schoon op cit note 118 at 43. 
122 Cassim et al op cit note 11 at 226. 
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Further it is not entirely clear how the removal of an obligation to issue at 
par value, removes the right to issue at par.123 It is after all this ‘right’ that 
is being forgone by issuing shares as fully paid up. 
This argument was however never considered in the Labat case as the 
share issue was concluded in 1999, thus the capital maintenance regime 
was still applicable in South Africa. 
3.3.3 Stanton v Drayton Commercial Investments Co Ltd124       
In this case the taxpayer purchased an investment portfolio by issuing fully 
paid up shares at a premium. The question was whether this constituted 
‘consideration given’ for purposes of capital gains tax in calculating the 
base cost of the asset. The court of appeal held that the ‘consideration 
given’ was the credit provided by crediting the shares as fully paid up and 
not the value of the shares themselves. The subsequent value of the 
consideration being the issue price agreed upon. The house of lords 
however found that the value of the shares themselves constitute 
‘consideration’, but still valued with reference to the issue price agreed. 
Thus the ‘consideration’ differed, but not the quantum. 
Jansen van Rensburg cautions against an unqualified application of 
Stanton to the ‘expenditure’ question as the court dealt with the phrase 
‘consideration given’ which carries a wider import than ‘expenditure’ and 
states that such cases takes the enquiry no further.125 Meyerowitz 
however still regarded it as additional authority to supplement Osborne.126 
If one accepts that ‘cost’ as considered in Osborne’s case aids our cause, 
could it not be argued that reference by the high court in Stanton to the 
words of Lord Greene in Osborne illustrates that the court regarded 
‘consideration given’ and ‘cost’ in the same light?127 Nevertheless, the 
                                            
123 The question whether the right to issue shares for consideration constitutes a ‘right’ in 
the legal sense and as such an asset, will be discussed in chapter 5.3.3.  
124 Stanton v Drayton Commercial Investments Co Ltd 1982 1 All ER 121 (CA), Stanton v 
Drayton Commercial Investments Co Ltd 1982 2 All ER 942 (HL).  
125 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 68, emphasises that the focus of 
‘cost’/’expenditure’ is whether the taxpayer has expended something and not whether to 
counter-party has been recompensed, the latter being focused on in the case of 
‘consideration given’.  
126 DM op cit note 104 . 
127 Stanton v Drayton Commercial Investments Co Ltd 1980 3 All ER 221. 
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Inland Revenue conceded that the taxpayer incurred cost and the question 
was subsequently never addressed in court. 
3.3.4 Craddock (Inspector of Taxes) v Zevo Finance Co Ltd128 
In casu the taxpayer acquired trading assets by issuing shares in the 
company at their nominal value. Revenue contended that the ‘cost’ of the 
assets acquired could not be equal to the nominal value of the shares 
issued. Lord Greene MR states the argument for revenue as follows: 
‘Mr Stamp’s argument rejects the whole basis of costs, and asserts that 
the transaction was not …one of sale and purchase, that there was no 
such thing as cost, that the investments cost the respondents nothing 
and that a different basis to that of cost must therefore be adopted…. 
the only basis which can be accepted is that of market value.’129 (own 
emphasis) 
Rejecting as follows: 
‘What then, was the substance of the transaction under which the 
respondent acquired these investments? First of all they acquired them 
by virtue of a contract of sale and purchase the validity of which, as 
importing legal rights and obligations between the parties to it cannot be 
impugned…. the respondents acquired the investments in consideration 
of their undertaking to the (seller) … to issue fully paid shares… and it 
seems to me quite impossible to accept the view upon which Mr 
Stamp’s whole argument was based that they must be taken as having 
acquired the investments in a manner which was not in law contractual 
and for no consideration at all.’130  
The House of Lords confirming through Lord Simonds says: 
‘I cannot distinguish between consideration and purchase price, and 
(using again the language of the Master of the Rolls) I find that, 
acquiring the investments “under a bona fide and unchallengeable 
contract”, they paid the price which that contract required, a price which, 
whether too high or low according to the views of third parties, was the 
price upon which the parties agreed.’131 
 
The court thus held that the ‘consideration given’ by the taxpayer was the 
agreed purchase price, being equal to the nominal value of the shares 
issued in casu. 
                                            
128 Craddock supra note 116. 
129 Ibid para 570E-H. 
130 Ibid para 571A-E. 
131 Craddock (Inspector of Taxes) v Zevo Finance Co Ltd (1944) 27 TC 267 (HL) at 295. 
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It is contended by Jansen van Rensburg that Craddock does not take the 
enquiry any further as Inland Revenue conceded that ‘cost’ was incurred 
by the taxpayer.132 The researcher however finds this difficult to accept on 
a reading of the above quoted passages by Lord Greene MR in stating the 
argument for revenue.   
3.3.5 Summary         
Taken as a whole the above mentioned foreign cases, with the exception 
of Lowry illustrates a willingness to allow share-based payments as a 
deduction. With regards to what constitutes the exact consideration and 
what value to place thereon they however differ to some extent.  
Despite all this, the court of appeal still felt that these cases do not add to 
the question of what constitutes ‘expenditure’ in terms of the act. As such 
this could be regarded as moot and irrelevant to our inquiry.  
It is not disputed that ‘consideration’ and ‘expenditure’ on the ordinary 
dictionary meaning of the words are different and not substitutable 
terms.133 What is emphasised is the context within which the word 
‘consideration’ was considered in the above cases and the relevance 
ascribed to it therein. Although the Craddock case dealt with 
‘consideration given’ it nevertheless considered whether this 
‘consideration’ constituted ‘cost’ incurred in the acquisition of an asset for 
tax purposes.  
The researcher believes that these cases, especially those that dealt with 
the issue of ‘cost’ add insight when discussing ‘expenditure’ and support 
the finding that share-based payments should be regarded as such.   
 
 
 
 
                                            
132 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 67. 
133 See A De Cock Die uitreik van aandele ten einde verpligtinge na te kom – onkoste 
werklik aangegaan vir inkomstebelastingdoeleindes of nie (unpublished MCom Tax 
theses, Stell, 2012) at 39-40 where the author clearly illustrates the difference in meaning 
between the two concepts.  
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3.4 Secondary sources on the meaning of expenditure 
Van Zyl, in considering the definition of ‘expenditure’, also looks at 
‘consideration’ as defined.134 Consideration constitutes anything given or 
promised by one party in exchange for the promise or undertaking by 
another.135 He contends that while ‘expenditure’ is restricted to the outlay 
of money, consideration has a wider meaning to include the exchange of 
anything for something else. 
He refers with confirmation to Harms AP, where he states that expenditure 
can be in a form other than money. He continues in stating that as such 
the interpretation given to ‘consideration’ in Osborne’s case fits in well in 
determining the meaning of ‘expenditure’.136 
He confirms the diminution test laid down by Goldblatt J and Harms AP, 
but warns against a strict application of the impoverishment test as 
requiring a movement of assets. This could lead to confusing ‘expenditure’ 
with the actual payment or parting of assets. 
He illustrates by way of the following example: ‘By incurring a debt to 
obtain goods or services, the taxpayer’s estate… will also lose value when 
it becomes indebted to pay an amount and hence be impoverished.’137 
The author is thus of the opinion that a diminution/impoverishment test is 
appropriate in determining expenditure, but that the movement of assets 
as required by Labat, is not correct. 
 
Meyerowitz contends that ‘expenditure’ may take any form that has value 
in money or money’s worth.138 Where it does not take the form of cash, the 
expenditure equals the value of the asset transferred.139 This is similar to 
the test applied by Watermeyer CJ in defining ‘amount’ in the context of 
gross income.  
                                            
134 S P Van Zyl ‘The Meaning of “Expenditure” for Purposes of Section 11(a) and (gA) of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962’ (2012) Obiter 186 at 189. 
135 Oxford dictionary op cit note 59. 
136 Osborne supra note 113. 
137 Van Zyl op cit note 134 at 189. 
138 Meyerowitz ‘Meyerowitz on Income Tax 2005-2006’ (2006) The Taxpayer para 11 32.   
139 Ibid. 
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‘…the word ‘amount must be given a wider meaning, and must include not 
only money, but the value of every form of property earned by the 
taxpayer, whether corporeal or incorporeal which has a money value’140 
‘Property’ being defined by Watermeyer CJ as follows: ‘… all rights vested 
in him which have a pecuniary or economic value.’141 
As regards to what constitutes a ‘Money value’, there has been some 
differing opinions in our courts. Stander’s case held that an amount would 
only be included in a taxpayer’s gross income, if the amount could be 
turned into money or money’s worth by the taxpayer. This was thus a 
subjective enquiry into the taxpayer’s ability to turn the property received 
into money.142 Brummeria merely required that a monetary value should 
be able to be placed on the property, objectively speaking.143  
If the interpretation given to ‘amount’ above is applied to ‘expenditure’ 
mutatis mutandis, could it not be argued that the incurrence of an 
obligation (namely an obligation vested in taxpayer, which the 
extinguishing of, would require money’s worth) would in itself constitute 
expenditure.  
Applying this to the facts of Labat one could possibly argue that the 
Stander approach would require that the extinguishing of the liability 
requires consideration by the taxpayer that is money, or could be turned 
into money by him. The researcher contends that this is the case, if one 
considers that the company could have issued the shares for cash. 
On the objective approach of Brummeria it could be contended that 
regardless of the consideration given by the taxpayer, objectively speaking 
the party would still be regarded as having been indebted to the creditor 
for a monetary value being the purchase price debt.  
As such, Meyerowitz’s approach would provide a satisfying symmetry 
between the concepts of ‘amount’ as used in gross income and 
‘expenditure’ as used in the general deduction formula. Harms AP, 
                                            
140 Lategan v CIR 1926 CPD 203 at 208-9. 
141 CIR v Estate Crewe and Another 1943 AD 656 at 667. 
142 Stander v CIR 1997 (3) SA 617 (C). 
143 CSARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 601 (SCA).  
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however regarded this as inappropriate, stating: ‘The equation (if there is 
one) is therefore much more complicated than suggested by counsel.’144 It 
is duly conceded that symmetry between income and expenditure is not a 
requisite of our tax system, but such a state of affairs still provides an 
amount of satisfaction. 
 
De Swardt considers the key requirement of expenditure an outgoing 
diminishment or deprivation of the taxpayer’s patrimony, or that something 
should have come from his pocket. This deprivation should be in money or 
something that has a value in money.145 This would seem to correspond 
with Meyerowitz’s view as stated above. 
 
Silke submits that expenditure is not restricted to money, but that outflows 
in forms other than cash should also be included.146 The following 
example is used as illustration: Where the taxpayer purchases goods in 
terms of a contract, and the purchase price is specified as a monetary 
amount, but the contract provides that settlement must or can take place 
by way of consideration in kind, that consideration would be regarded as 
‘expenditure actually incurred’. Where the purchase price is not specified 
as a monetary amount, the consideration in kind would not be regarded as 
expenditure. Reason being that no outlay or diminution of assets has been 
incurred.147  
What Silke thus requires is that the initial contract in terms of which the 
obligation is incurred, states a monetary amount. Namely the incurrence of 
an obligation which the hypothetical settlement of, would lead to the 
diminution of assets. The subsequent payment in this case (either in 
cash/shares/services or kind) is merely the discharging of the monetary 
                                            
144 Labat supra note 8 at para 17. 
145 De Swardt op cit note 15 at 479.  
146 Silke op cit note 76. 
147 Ibid. 
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obligation and thus not relevant. Cilliers contends that this is similar to the 
approach in Labat.148 
Where the initial contract states no monetary amount, but merely provides 
for consideration in kind in the form of shares/services rendered, there 
would be no expenditure. Reason being that the hypothetical settlement of 
the obligation does not require a diminution of assets.  
 
Marais confirms that the word expenditure should be interpreted with 
reference to its ordinary meaning and the context within which it is used.149 
Despite this he feels that the courts approach in Labat, was ‘overly 
conservative’. He contends that the meaning as attributed by the appeal 
court is so narrow that it could possibly even be a deterrent to expenditure 
incurred on loan account.  
He is of the opinion that ‘expenditure’ has d veloped not as an ordinary 
dictionary meaning, but rather as an technical accounting term and that 
this technical meaning should be followed in tax law.150 
International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter IFRS) defines 
expenses as follows: 
‘The definition of expenses encompasses losses as well as those 
expenses that arise in the course of ordinary activities of the entity…. 
They usually take the form of an outflow or depletion of assets such as 
cash and cash equivalents, inventory, property, plant and equipment’ 
(emphasis added)151 
 
This seems to confirm the approach that a diminution of assets is required, 
but it further provides: 
‘Expenses are recognised in the income statement when a decrease in 
future economic benefits related to a decrease in an asset or an 
increase of a liability has arisen that can be measured reliably. This 
means, in effect, that recognition of expenses occurs  simultaneously 
                                            
148 See Cilliers op cit note 70. 
149 Marais op cit note 94 at 8. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Para 4.33 of the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 2010, issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Board and Approved by the Accounting Practices 
board (hereafter framework).  
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with the recognition of an increase in liabilities or a decrease in 
assets…”152 
‘A liability is recognised …when it is probable that an outflow of 
resources embodying economic benefits will result from the 
settlement…and the amount…measured reliably.’153 
‘The settlement of a present obligation usually involves the entity giving 
up resources embodying economic benefits…for example by: (a) 
payment of cash; (b) transfer of other assets (c) provision of services… 
(e) conversion of the obligation to equity.’154 
 
It would seem that IFRS applies a diminution test, but importantly does not 
restrict it to the outlay of assets. It also regards the incurrence of an 
obligation, of which the settlement would lead to an outflow of economic 
benefits as an expense. The two recognitions (expense and liability) occur 
simultaneously. This approach reminds us of the test applied by Silke, but 
instead of the hypothetical settlement requiring a diminution of assets, 
IFRS merely requires an outflow of economic benefits.  
The issue of shares or rendering of services as consideration would be 
regarded as expenditure for accounting purposes, as this is regarded as 
an outflow of economic benefits. 
Our courts have showed a general hesitance and unwillingness in the past 
as regards the application of accounting principles to tax law.155 As 
Partington states ‘…if the person sought to be taxed comes within the 
letter of the law, he must be taxed...’156 
Nonetheless in the Golden Dump’s case the court in considering whether 
pending litigation could be regarded as a suspending the ‘actual 
incurrence of expenditure’, availed itself to ‘contingency’ as defined in 
financial accounting for assistance.157   
It is contended that accounting principles should not suddenly be accepted 
as stating the law, but that in the specific context of tax law, where the 
fields of accounting and law are often delicately intertwined, it would be 
unwise not to take consideration of the position as stated in accounting 
when interpreting the relevant provision in law.      
 
                                            
152 Framework op cit note 151 para 4.49. 
153 Framework op cit note 151 para 4.46. 
154 Framework op cit note 151 para 4.17. 
155 See Pyott Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 13 SATC 121 at 126; Caltex Oil 
supra note 31 at 14. 
156 Partington v Attorney General 21 LT 370 para 375. Confirmed in CIR v George Forest 
Timber 1924 AD 516 at 531-2; CIR v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A) at 592. 
157 CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 110 (A) at 206. 
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3.5 Contributory value of loss? 
As stated above, s11(a) of the act speaks of ‘expenditure and losses 
actually incurred’. This leads us to ask what role if any this term ‘loss’ ads 
to our enquiry. 
In Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, the leading 
case on the difference between loss and expenditure, Watermeyer stated: 
‘…in relation to trading operations the word is sometimes used to signify a 
deprivation suffered by the loser, usually an involuntary deprivation, 
whereas expenditure usually means a voluntary payment of money.158 
Meyerowitz is of the opinion that it would be problematic to assign a 
different meaning to expenditure from that given to losses.159 It would 
seem then that the main difference is found in the involuntary nature of 
losses as opposed to the voluntary nature of expenditure. 
This is in line with IFRS which states: ‘Losses represent decreases in 
economic benefits and as such they are no different in nature from other 
expenses.’160 
Interestingly, the Plate Glass and Shatterprufe Industries Finance Co (Pty) 
Ltd case, dealt with the question whether an ‘accounting loss’, being the 
calculated exchange difference as between purchase date and year end, 
should be regarded as a loss for purposes of s11(a).161 The court finding 
in the taxpayers favour. Silke argues that in the absence of an 
interpretation of the word ‘loss’ by our courts, such an finding could not be 
supported as accounting principles are irrelevant for purposes of the 
income tax act.162 Nonetheless the court once again accepted accounting 
principles as informing the enquiry.      
 
      
 
                                            
158 Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1946 AD 157 para 166. 
159 Meyerowitz op cit note 138 para 11 31. 
160 Framework op cit note 151 para 4.34. 
161 1979 (3) SA 1124 (T) at 108. 
162 Silke op cit note 76 para 7.4. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
The Labat case brings a binding end to any dispute as regards the import 
of ‘expenditure’ in the phrase ‘expenditure actually incurred’. The 
researcher contends that Harms AP correctly required that the obligation 
should also satisfy the requirements of ‘expenditure’, as it is firmly 
established in statutory construction that every word in the act must be 
given meaning to.163   
The court consequently in providing the first binding definition of 
expenditure for tax purposes required a movement of assets. This reading 
would exclude shares issued for services rendered, or services rendered 
as consideration. This requirement is a bit more contentious and rightly so 
in the opinion of the researcher.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
163 L C Steyn Uitleg van Wette 5 ed (1981) at 17-19; Golden Dumps supra note 157 para 
116.  
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Chapter 4 Actually incurred   
4.1 Introduction 
As already discussed, s11(a) and para20(1) of the eight schedule requires 
that ‘expenditure be actually incurred’. Traditionally the whole phrase was 
considered as a whole and interpreted accordingly, but as our study has 
shown this approach has been changed in recent times and two distinct 
requirements have emerged. Up to now we have only addressed the first 
element, namely ‘expenditure’. The question now turns to what ‘actually 
incurred’ means against the backdrop of Labat.   
What follows is an brief discussion of the leading cases on the meaning of 
‘actually incurred’, where after we consider the effect, if any, that Labat 
has had on this requirement. 
 
4.2 Case law dealing with ‘actually incurred’     
4.2.1 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR164 
In dealing with the phrase ‘actually incurred’, Watermeyer AJP (as he was 
then), states that use of the word ‘actually’ widens the field of application 
beyond the scope of necessity. He continues by saying that what is 
required is not actual payment, but the mere incurrence of an obligation to 
pay. 
 
4.2.2 Concentra (Pty) Ltd v CIR165 
In casu the taxpayer company, agreed to compensate directors for 
travelling cost incurred on company business. The liability was incurred 
over a period of three years, upon completion of which the company paid 
the directors and claimed the total expenditure. The court rejecting, states 
that expenditure had to be deducted in the year in which the liability arose, 
regardless of when actual payment occurred. 
                                            
164 1936 CPD 241, 8 SATC 13. 
165 1942 CPD 509, 12 SATC 95. 
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4.2.3 Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR166 
The taxpayer incurred two debts in sterling pounds. These debts 
subsequently declined as a result of favourable exchange rates. The effect 
being that one debt was settled at a lesser amount (in rand value) than the 
amount initially incurred. The other being carried at a lesser amount on 
year end than initially recognised. The question arose what amount (in 
rand) should be regarded as actually incurred?          
The court found that it is only on year end that expenditure actually 
incurred can be determined. The rand value of the unsettled debt on year 
end would consequently be deductible. As regards the debt settled before 
year end, it is the amount paid that would be deductible.  
This case has been the topic of much discussion as a result of Harms AP’s 
reliance thereon for stating that: ‘the liability or obligation must be 
discharged by means of expenditure.’167 
 
4.2.4 Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI168 
The taxpayer company paid b nuses to its employees on 30 September 
each year, on condition that the employee was still in the employ of the 
company as at 31 October. The company claiming these bonuses as a 
deduction for the year ending 31 March of the same year.  
The taxpayer argued that the condition was of a resolutive nature and as 
such not an impediment to the incurrence of an unconditional obligation. 
The court finding that regardless of the nature of the uncertainty (whether 
resolutive or suspensive), where an uncertainty as to the obligation existed 
after year end, it could not be said that an unconditional obligation has 
been incurred.  
The court also found although obiter, that where an obligation is paid 
before the unconditional obligation comes into existence, the expenditure 
would still be regarded as actually incurred only on incurrence of the 
                                            
166 Caltex Oil supra note 31.   
167 See chapter 3.2.6 for full discussion. 
168 Nasionale Pers supra note 31. 
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obligation. Advance payment of an expense, before liability to pay has 
arisen does render the outlay of cash/assets, expenditure actually 
incurred.169      
 
4.2.5 Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR170  
Edgars was party to a lease agreement. The lease provided that basic rent 
be payable on a monthly basis, but should turnover exceed a yearly limit, 
an additional amount would be payable. The taxpayer’s year end being 
before the completion of lease year, the question arose whether the 
turnover rental, based on turnover levels only determinable at end of lease 
year, was deductible.  
The court being in agreement as to the law, the case hinged on a question 
of fact. Did the rental clause create an unconditional obligation in tax year 
which was only quantifiable at end of lease year, or did it postpone the 
incurrence of an unconditional obligation to end of lease. 
The full bench agreed that where the amount could only be quantified at a 
later stage falling outside of tax year, the deduction would still be allowed, 
provided that an unconditional obligation exists at year end.171    
The majority by word of Corbett JA, held that there existed two distinct 
rental obligations, namely basic and turnover. The judge finding that as 
regards the turnover rental, the obligation only becomes unconditional at 
end of lease year. This falling outside the tax year, no unconditional 
obligation existed and deduction was disallowed. Nicholas AJA dissenting 
on the question of fact as stated above. 
 
 
                                            
169 Income Tax Cases and Materials op cit note 95 at 327, reference is also made to ITC 
380 9 SATC 347 at 348, where the court found that moneys paid out constitute 
expenditure actually incurred at date of payment.   
170 Edgars supra note 78.  
171 See the court a quo, CIR v Edgars Stores Ltd 1986 (4) SA 312 para 319, where 
Ackermann J discusses the courts approach to unquantifiable amounts. He states that 
courts are willing to work with a deduction in case of uncertainty, which is fair and 
reasonable. The taxpayer has merely to establish the amount on a balance of probability. 
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4.2.6 CIR v Golden Dumps172 
The taxpayer company employed a financial director (Nash) on agreement 
that he be entitled to certain shares at R88 250 on completion of certain 
negotiations. Nash was subsequently discharged upon which he claimed 
transfer of the shares on 6 January 1981. The company refused and court 
proceedings ensued. The court finding in favour of Nash on 27 March 
1985. The company in complying with the order, incurred a loss which it  
sought to deduct in the 1985 year of assessment. 
The court found that there exists no difference in principle between a 
contingency in the legal sense and one in the popular sense. As to what 
constitutes a contingency in the popular sense the court states: ‘a claim 
which was disputed, at any rate genuinely disputed and not vexatiously or 
frivolously for the purposes of delay…’ 
The court comes to the conclusion that where the outcome of a dispute as 
regards the expenditure is undetermined at year end, it cannot be said to 
be actually incurred. The court allowing the deduction in the 1985 year of 
assessment.   
 
4.2.7 ITC 1444173      
Contracts were concluded by the taxpayer for the acquisition of certain 
production materials. The contracts provided for a fixed or determinable 
price and it was agreed that the contracts created an unconditional 
obligation on the part of the taxpayer to purchase the materials. The 
taxpayer claimed these deductions in the year the contracts were 
concluded, but before delivery of the materials. The commissioner not 
allowing the deduction. 
The court by word of McCreath J holding that the taxpayer’s liability to pay 
was conditional upon the seller’s performance, namely his delivery of the 
bills of lading. Prior to this delivery the taxpayer has not ‘actually incurred’ 
                                            
172 1993 (4) SA 110 (A). 
173 51 SATC 35. 
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an unconditional obligation to pay. Consequently no deduction was 
allowed.         
What ITC 1444 then requires is not just the absence of any suspensive or 
resolutive condition in the legal sense, but also an indefeasible duty to pay 
before end of tax year.174 This however does not mean that it should be 
payable in the year of assessment. Should the taxpayer pay before year 
end, but the indefeasible duty to pay has not arisen, it would seem that the 
expenditure would still be regarded as not ‘actually incurred’ on the 
reading of Nasionale Pers v KBI.175   
4.2.8 Ackermans Limited v CSARS176  
The taxpayer company sold a business to pep stores at a purchase price 
of R800 million. The taxpayer contended that the asset value of the 
business sold was equal to R1 129 million. It accepted the amount of 
R800 million in conjunction with pep taking over its contingent liabilities to 
the amount of R329 million. Ackermans subsequently claimed the portion 
of the asset purchase price it had foregone, being equal to the value of the 
contingent liabilities as expenditure in terms of s11(a). The commissioner 
contending among other that the foregoing did not constitute ‘expenditure’ 
or ‘expenditure actually incurred’.   
The court unfortunately did not deal expressly with the issue whether the 
right foregone constitutes ‘expenditure’, but rather focused on the second 
element namely whether it was actually incurred.  
The court stating:  
‘”expenditure incurred” means the undertaking of an obligation to pay or 
(which amounts to the same thing) the actual incurring of a liability. No 
liability was incurred by Ackermans towards Pepkor in terms of the sale 
agreement.’177 
 
The foregoing of the full purchase price, was not regarded in fact or law as 
‘expenditure incurred’. The taxpayer never had an obligation towards 
                                            
174 Income Tax Cases and Materials op cit note 95 at 338. 
175 Nasionale Pers supra note 31 at 73. 
176 2011 (1) SA 1 (SCA). 
177 Ibid  para 8. 
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Pepkor, which could be said to have been discharged by the accepting of 
a lesser purchase price. Consequently no expenditure was actually 
incurred.  
 
4.3 Summary and the effect of Labat on ‘actually incurred’. 
Having regard to all of the above stated cases, the researcher contends 
that the position as to what ‘actually incurred’ means can be summarised 
as follows.  
It requires the incurrence of an unconditional obligation, both in the legal 
and popular sense. This entails that there should be no unsettled disputes 
as regards the obligation. Further this obligation should be of such a 
nature that the taxpayer has an indefeasible duty to pay. This does not 
require that it should be paid or payable in the year of assessment. Finally 
the obligation would still be regarded as ‘actually incurred’ if it only 
becomes quantifiable after year end, as long as an unconditional 
obligation exists. Finally we need to consider the effect of Labat on the 
above stated position. 
As discussed above, Labat, required that the unconditional obligation be 
discharged by means of expenditure. This was criticised by many as 
placing the cart before the horse. The researcher contended on the 
reading of Cilliers, that the wording should be rephrased to give effect to 
the true inte tion of Harms AP.  
‘The liability or obligation should be discharged by means of a diminution 
or movement of assets for the incurrence of the liability to constitute 
expenditure actually incurred.’ (Rephrased)178 
 
On this reading, Labat, has not affected the ‘actually incurred’ 
requirement. The test will still be whether an unconditional obligation has 
been incurred as discussed in case law above. Labat, rather amends the 
existing position by circumscribing the nature of the obligation incurred. 
The obligation while still complying with all the above stated requirements 
                                            
178 Cilliers op cit note 70. 
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should now be of such a nature that its hypothetical discharge would 
require the diminution or movement of assets. In such a case the 
obligation would constitute ‘expenditure’.   
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Chapter 5 Commentary on Labat and the true meaning of 
‘expenditure actually incurred’. 
5.1 Introduction  
As the discussion above has already shown, the Labat case and its 
implications for share-based payments and the rendering of services as 
consideration has been met with a large deal of criticism and academic 
debate. In consequence, a variety of arguments exist that pose to either 
refute or support the reasoning of Harms AP.  
What follows in this chapter is an attempt by the researcher to summarise 
all these arguments in to a more defined list. Each argument will be 
analysed individually by looking at both academic and judicial viewpoints 
on the issue. Thereafter the researcher will pose to conclude each item by 
providing an opinion as to the merits of the argument.  
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5.2 “The Cart before the Horse” argument  
5.2.1 The argument 
Marais accepts that the terms ‘expenditure’ and ‘obligation’ are not 
synonyms, but argues that an obligation always arises from 
expenditure.179 An obligation cannot exist without expenditure being 
incurred in the first place. Thus he contends that the court conceptually 
erred in regarding an obligation as preceding the expenditure when it 
stated that the obligation should be discharged by way of expenditure.180 
He finds support for his statement in the basic principles of accounting.  
In accounting assets equal the sum of liabilities and equity. Thus where a 
liability (obligation) increases (credit entry), this has to be represented as 
either a decrease in equity (expenditure) or an increase in assets (debit 
entry). The expenditure and obligation thus come into existence 
simultaneously. It is on this basis that Marais argues that the existence of 
an unconditional obligation, such as the obligation to issue shares, is a 
smoking gun as to the existence of expenditure.  
He contends that in determining whether expenditure exists, one has to 
look at the reason why the obligation arose in the first place, and not with 
reference to how the obligation would be settled in future. 
 
Emslie supports this argument in stating expenditure must first exist before 
it can be actually incurred.181 Expenditure does not discharge a liability, 
but rather gives rise to it in the first place. It is payment or performance 
that discharges the obligation that flows from the notionally anterior 
expenditure. All that is required for expenditure to be actually incurred is 
                                            
179 Marais op cit note 94 at 4. 
180 Labat supra note 8 para 8. 
181 Editorial ‘Income Tax – Deductions – Expenditure Actually Incurred – Meaning of 
Expenditure – Shares Issued as Consideration not Expenditure: CSARS v Labat Africa Ltd’ 
(2011) The Taxpayer 167. 
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the existence of an unconditional obligation; the manner of subsequent 
discharging is irrelevant to this enquiry.182   
The author none the less affirms the point as raised by Harms AP that one 
has to have expenditure before the question of ‘actually incurred’ even 
arises. As to what this expenditure should entail, it would seem from the 
above, that the mere incurrence of an obligation would suffice. 
 
Cilliers agrees that expenditure must exist before the question of actually 
incurred becomes of concern, but importantly adds that one needs to ask 
in what sense expenditure must exist.183 
In rejecting the ‘cart before horse’ argument of the above mentioned 
authors, Cilliers contends that one can approach ‘expenditure actually 
incurred’, in such a way as to harmonise the concerns of Marais and 
Emslie with that of Harms AP in Labat.184  
He argues that ‘expenditure actually incurred’ although providing two 
distinct requirements, should nevertheless be read as a whole with the 
words giving colour and context to each other.185  
(i): ‘expenditure’ requires a diminution or movement of assets.               
(ii): ‘actually incurred’ requires the incurrence of an unconditional 
obligation.  
The two requirements interact in such a way as to raise and lower the bar 
for compliance. ‘Expenditure’ raises the bar in requiring more than the 
mere incurrence of an unconditional obligation as required by (ii), by 
qualifying the subject matter of the obligation. The obligation should be of 
such a nature that its discharge would require the diminution/movement of 
                                            
182 Editorial ‘Income Tax – Expenditure Actually Incurred – Payment By The Issue Of Own 
Shares: CSARS v Labat Africa Ltd 72 SATC 75’ (2010) The Taxpayer 38. This also 
supported by Ger op cit note 83. 
183 Cilliers op cit note 70 at 226. 
184 Ibid. 
185 This approach finds support in the CSARS v Airworld CC 2008 (3) SA 335 (SCA) 
where the court held that a word must ‘…take its colour, like a chameleon from its setting 
and surrounds in the act.’  
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assets. On the other hand actually incurred, lowers the bar for (i), by 
requiring a mere obligation, and not actual settlement. 
On this reading of para 8 of Labat, the obligation is not regarded as 
preceding the expenditure, but rather that they come into existence 
simultaneously, given that the obligation’s subject matter conforms to the 
above mentioned requirements. 
As Cilliers states:  
‘It seems that Harms AP did not really put the cart before the horse. He 
simply looked at the cart first, ignoring the horse altogether, because 
the answer to the question with which the court was confronted was to 
be found in the cart.’186  
 
The big difference between Cilliers approach on the one hand and Marais 
and Emslie on the other, is that he looks at the method of 
discharge/payment in order to ascertain the existence of expenditure, 
whereas the other two authors argue that this is irrelevant in ascertaining 
expenditure and that the answer should rather lie in the reason for the 
incurrence of the obligation in the first place. 
 
Jansen van Rensburg takes a view similar to that of Cilliers as regards the 
Labat case.187 The author emphasises that the mere incurrence of an 
unconditional obligation is not sufficient, but that regard has to be taken of 
the nature or subject matter of the obligation. The obligation should be of 
such a nature that its discharge would require a movement of assets. Thus 
focus is once again placed on the method of payment, in ascertaining 
whether expenditure exists.   
Van Zyl agrees with Labat that ‘expenditure’ adds a distinct requirement to 
the question of ‘expenditure actually incurred’.188 The problem lies in the 
application and content as to what constitutes ‘expenditure’. 
He argues that the court failed to distinguish between expenditure and the 
consequent discharge thereof in stating in par 6 that an obligation should 
                                            
186 Cilliers op cit note 70 at 228. 
187 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 63. 
188 Van Zyl op cit note 134 at 188. 
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be discharged by way of expenditure.189 He contends that Labat confused 
the meaning of expenditure in holding that it required actual payment.190 
This is contrary to the well-established rules concerning ‘actually incurred’ 
as laid out in Naspers, Edgars Stores and Caltex which hold that an 
unconditional obligation is required, not actual payment.191 
It is argued that this creates a situation in which a person incurring a 
unconditional obligation in year one, but only paying in year two would 
never be able to deduct, as the expenditure only exists in year two, but it 
was actually incurred in year one and should have been deducted 
accordingly in that year.192  
The researcher contends that this viewpoint taken by the learned author is 
incorrect, and that Labat did not require actual payment before 
expenditure could be said to exist. In this regard the interpretation of Labat 
as given by Cilliers and Jansen van Rensburg is argued to be more 
correct. 
As regards the meaning to be attributed to ‘expenditure’, the author having 
regard to the diminution requirement as laid down by Harms AP approves 
a so called impoverishment test.193 It is however difficult and often 
awkward to apply as the party will often be only temporarily impoverished 
and not be poorer at the end of the day, as the assets acquired are more 
valuable than the purchase price given up. Given this difficulty, the author 
cautions against confusing the incurrence of expenditure with the 
subsequent payment or parting of assets.194 This point is also emphasised 
by the ‘cart before horse’ supporters as mentioned above. 
Harms AP in applying this impoverishment test added the requirement of 
asset movement as a minimum. Van Zyl argues that this is unfounded and 
that impoverishment would not necessarily coincide with the movement of 
                                            
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 See chapter 4 on actually incurred. 
192 Van Zyl op cit note 134 at 188. 
193 Ibid at 189. 
194 Ibid. 
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assets.195 As an example he describes the typical situation of barter 
trading and the anomaly that would arise should Labat be followed.  
A (dentist) and B (painter) decide to render services to each other in their 
respective trades to the value of R10 000. A renders a service to the value 
of R10 000 (he could have charged another patient this amount) in 
exchange for which he receives painting services form B to the value of 
R10 000. On the reading of Labat, A would not be able to deduct the 
R10 000 he expends on painting as there is no change in A’s assets. He 
would nevertheless still be taxed on the amount he becomes entitled to as 
a result of the rendering of his dental services.196 
Van Zyl states that a person’s estate becomes impoverished by the 
incurrence of a debt to pay the opposite party.197 He continues in stating 
that A in the above scenario becomes impoverished through the foregoing 
of his right that he would otherwise have had to claim the R10 000 for his 
dental services.198 Expenditure does not require actual payment.   
As regards the issue of shares, Van Zyl nevertheless agrees with Harms 
AP, that it only impoverishes the shareholders and not the company itself. 
Consequently no expenditure would exist on the facts of Labat in Van Zyl’s 
opinion.  
Van Zyl’s objections raise interesting questions as to the role played by 
impoverishment and the diminution or movement of assets in connection 
with our enquiry. Is the diminution/movement of assets essential or would 
something less suffice? Should the incurrence of an obligation which 
impoverishes be enough to constitute expenditure despite not affecting 
assets? These questions are discussed in the final part of this section. 
 
 
 
                                            
195 Ibid. 
196 Gross income as defined in section 1 para (c) of the act. 
197 Van Zyl op cit note 134 at 189. 
198 This will be addressed in chapter 5.3 where we discuss the right forgone argument. 
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5.2.2 Movement of assets? 
As our discussion in chapter 3.2 above has shown cases before Labat 
held differing opinions as to this question. ITC 1783 holding that an 
diminution was required whereas the North Gauteng High Court 
confirming ITC 1801 found the contrary.  
Burt argues that ITC 1801 required an unconditional obligation in terms of 
which performance with a monetary value is due.199 Relying on Caltex Oil 
he states that the consequent means of disposal is of no importance and 
that no movement of assets is required.200  
Burger in response argues that Caltex clearly requires that expenditure 
must exist prior to the question of ‘actually incurred’ becoming relevant.201 
A liability that is not an expense cannot pass the test. He criticises Burt’s 
position with reference to a barter trade.202 
Take again our example of A and B as discussed above. A incurs an 
obligation to render dental services with a monetary value of R10 000 in 
exchange for the painting service of R10 000. Applying Burt, A would thus 
have incurred an obligation with a monetary value and be able to deduct 
R10 000. His net taxable income would thus be zero, as this is cancelled 
out by the R10 000 taxable income. Burger criticises this view on the basis 
that A would never be subject to tax. The researcher contends that this 
loses track of the fact that the taxpayer is still being taxed on all his 
income. Should `there be a difference in values as regards the respective 
services; A would still have been taxed. The fact that his expenditure 
equals his income should not be a deterrent to allowing the expenditure in 
the first place.   
De Swardt in considering both the above mentioned arguments, states 
that the enquiry should still be whether the unconditional obligation 
amounts to an expense, and not merely whether it carries a monetary 
                                            
199 Burt op cit note 47 at 133. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Burger op cit note 97 at 39. 
202 Ibid at 41. 
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value.203 In determining whether the obligation amounts to expenditure, 
one would have regard to the extent/specifics of the obligation.204 Is it of 
such a nature, that an expense exists or would exist upon discharge of the 
liability. Expense in this context entails impoverishment which in turn 
requires a diminution of assets. 
 
5.2.3 Concluding remarks 
It is undeniable that the word expenditure added a dimension to the 
enquiry. The tests as laid down in Nasionale Pers and Edgars Stores 
never explicitly considered what expenditure adds to the question. 
Consequently Harms AP was completely correct to emphasise that 
expenditure was not synonymous with obligation/liability. 
As the above collection of opinions and cases has shown, there is no clear 
answer as to the question whether the mere incurrence of an obligation is 
sufficient for expenditure to be actually incurred. Case law before Labat 
gave differing opinions. ITC 1783, ITC 1801 (on the De Swardt reading) 
and the supreme court of appeal all held that a diminution/movement of 
assets would be required. ITC 1801 (on Burt’s reading) and the High Court 
in Labat required a mere obligation. 
Those in favour of the mere obligation position, rely on the cases as 
addressed as part of ‘actually incurred’, which as shown above did not 
focus much attention on the element of ‘expenditure’ in isolation, but rather 
considered the whole phrase. The researcher contends that these cases 
might be of less assistance in this regard, as one is not sure if they are 
merely addressing the timing issue. For this reason the position of Labat is 
preferred. Expenditure has to be shown to exist. 
Here we encounter another divide as ‘mere obligation supporters’ argue 
that expenditure should be defined on the basis of the reason for coming 
into existence of the obligation, whereas the ‘asset movement supporters’ 
argue definition on the basis of hypothetical settlement requirements. 
                                            
203 De Swardt op cit note 15 at 482. 
204 Ibid. 
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Should expenditure be made dependant on the future method of discharge 
or is this irrelevant to the enquiry? 
As an interesting closure to this argument one may make mention of 
Marais’ argument as regards asset diminution.205 The author, although not 
supporting an asset diminution requirement, nevertheless concludes that a 
diminution of assets exists on the facts of Labat.206 If one should for 
arguments sake accept that the shares were issued before Labat received 
the trademark, Labat would have a right to receive the trademark as 
consideration for the shares issued at date of issue (Case 1). This right to 
receive the trademark (a personal right to performance of a legal object) 
would constitute an asset for Labat. On subsequent receipt of the 
trademark, this right would cease to exist. Thus a diminution of assets can 
be said to have taken place. 
This at first glance seems to provide a clear and simple answer to our 
enquiry, but one should remember that Marais was ‘tweaking the facts’ in 
regarding the shares as being issued first. This theory provides no answer 
in the case where the trademark was first received (as was the case in 
Labat) and a subsequent obligation to issue shares existed (Case 2). 
Upon issue, an obligation is discharged, but no asset is diminished. As 
Harms AP has stated: ‘The fact that the parties may have constructed their 
agreement differently and tax-efficiently is entirely beside the point.’207 
The researcher contends that this illustrates the arbitrary nature of the test 
as applied in Labat. How could the existence of expenditure, be made 
contingent on the sequence in which payment is made. It is contended 
that Marais’ approach to determine expenditure on the basis of what gives 
rise to the obligation in the first place, is to be preferred over the approach 
of defining on method of settlement.208 The court also erred in not 
regarding the incurrence of an obligation in a similar light to the diminution 
of an asset as illustrated by the following.  
                                            
205 Marais op cit note 94 at 7. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Labat supra note 8 para 15. 
208 Marais op cit note 94 at 7. 
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In Marais’ tweaked set of facts no obligation arose, but rather an asset 
diminishment occurred upon receipt of the trademark. In this case, his test 
as to what gives rise to the obligation in the first place should accordingly 
be adjusted as follows: ‘What gave rise to the diminution of assets in the 
first place.’ 
The answer to both questions in case 1 and 2, would be the same, namely 
the acquisition of an trademark. It is on this basis that expenditure should 
accordingly be defined. Whether an obligation is incurred or an asset is 
diminished is merely indicative of the sequence of events. This approach 
would be in accordance with IFRS by regarding expenses as arising from 
either a decrease in assets or an increase in liabilities.209 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
209 Framework op cit note 151 para 4.49. 
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5.3 The ‘Right forgone’ argument 
5.3.1 The argument 
This argument assumes that a diminution of assets is a prerequisite for 
expenditure. It does not dispute the interpretation given to expenditure by 
Harms AP, but rather finds fault with the conclusion that shares issued as 
fully credited up does not involve a movement or diminution of assets.   
Ger states that by issuing shares in lieu of a cash payment, a company is 
reducing its assets, by giving up what it would have been entitled to claim, 
namely payment in cash, for the issue of its shares.210       
Van Zyl as we have seen above in 3.2.1 argued for an impoverishment 
test that does not necessarily require a movement of assets. He 
nevertheless also supported the idea of impoverishment by way of a ‘right 
forgone’.211 He states that a taxpayer, who has incurred expenditure 
without parting of any money/assets, but rather by parting with the right to 
charge money, should still be entitled to deduct his expenses.212 The 
company would be impoverished in the sense that it receives no payment 
where it could have received payment should he not have forgone the 
right. The value of the expenditure would then equal the value of the 
original obligation incurred, provided that it has a certain monetary value. 
As regards case law, English authority for this argument is found in the 
Osborne case where Lord Greeene MR states:  
‘The primary liability of an allottee of shares is to pay for them in cash, 
but when shares are allotted credited as fully paid, this primary liability 
is satisfied by a consideration other than cash passing form the allottee. 
A company, therefore when in pursuance of such a transaction, it 
agrees to credit the shares as fully paid, is giving up what it would 
otherwise have had – namely the right to call on the allottee for 
payment of the par value in cash.’213  
As we have already seen in our discussion on English authority in chapter 
3.3, Harms AP, did not regard these foreign cases as providing any 
assistance into the enquiry. As a consequence this argument was never 
                                            
210 Ger op cit note 83 at 62. 
211 Van Zyl op cit note 134 at 190. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Osborne supra note 113 at 637-638. 
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considered by a South African court. It is nevertheless contended that this 
argument should be given further attention based on our previous 
discussion on the relevance of Osborne.214 
 
5.3.2 More than just a spes, a personal right? 
De Swardt finds support for the right forgone argument in the companies 
act.215 As we have already discussed in the general overview of shares 
and share-issues, shares can be issued for a cash or kind consideration. 
The shares can however only be issued once they are fully paid up. There 
is thus a quid pro quo required for every share issued.  
This quid pro quo is regarded as a primary right of the company.216 
Namely the right to receive the subscription price in cash. Where the 
parties however agree to consideration in kind, this right will still exist but 
cash consideration will not be enforceable against the subscriber.217  
Where a company thus agrees to credit shares as fully paid up, it is giving 
up this right which it would otherwise have had to call on the allottee for 
payment in cash.  
De Swardt continues in stating that the forfeiture of an expectation could 
be classified as the forfeiture of a spes.218 A spes in turn is merely 
regarded as a hope/expectation of performance and thus not regarded as 
an enforceable right in law.219 The author however regards the primary 
right that is given up on acceptance of consideration in kind, as something 
more than a mere spes.220  
He argues that this primary right could be regarded as a personal right 
against the allottee for payment, which would have been enforceable if the 
subscription agreement did not provide for consideration in kind. Thus by 
agreeing to consideration in kind (crediting the shares as fully paid up), the 
                                            
214 See chapter 3.3. 
215 De Swardt op cit note 15 at 483. 
216 Blackman op cit note 20 at 255. 
217 Ibid. 
218 De Swardt op cit note 15 at 484. 
219 PM Nienaber ‘Cession’ 2 ed LAWSA vol 2(2) (2003) para 21.  
220 De Swardt op cit note 15 at 484. 
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company is parting with a personal right which in turn diminishes its 
assets.221  
 
5.3.3 Is this right an asset? 
In our introductory discussion as to the meaning of expenditure, we briefly 
looked at the meaning of ‘assets”.222 We found that it entails a subjective 
right to patrimonial objects. Thus a claim to a legal object with economic or 
material value. These among others include personal rights to 
performance, such as requiring a person to do or render something. 
We have seen further that before share issue, there exists no property 
(assets) for either the company or the shareholders.223 Upon issue, a 
asset comes into existence for the company in the form of a personal right 
to claim subscription consideration from the allottee. The allottee on the 
other hand receives the shares which constitute an asset in his hands.  
Van Rensburg argues on the above mentioned, that prior to issue a 
company has no ‘personal right’ to issue shares for cash.224 The ‘right’ that 
Osborne was referring to was rather the capacity/power to issue shares to 
raise capital, and not a personal right in the legal sense to receive cash 
consideration.225 The author consequently finds that this ‘right’ to issue 
shares for consideration cannot be regarded as an asset in the legal 
sense.    
5.3.4 Is an asset in the legal sense required? 
This question arises from the statement by Ger, that not only cash outlays 
as implied by ITC 1783, but all economic sacrifices associated with the 
acquisition of an item should be regarded as expenditure.226 He thus 
works with the concept of notional expenditure. The diminishing of assets 
should refer to economic sacrifices in the broader sense.  
                                            
221 Ibid. 
222 See chapter 3.1.  
223 See chapter 1.3. 
224 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 71. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ger op cit note 83 at 62. 
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 Van Rensburg in addressing this question refers to two cases in which the 
enquiry into strict adherence to the legal meaning came to the fore.227 The 
first being Brummeria Renaissance.228 In casu the court considered 
whether a right to interest free loans, constituted an ‘amount’ for purposes 
of gross income as defined in s1. 
“Amount’ was defined by Watermeyer J in Lategan v CIR as being not only 
money, but the value of any property earned by the taxpayer which has a 
monetary value.229    
Jansen van Rensburg states that supreme court of appeal found that the 
interest free loan constituted an amount despite the fact that it would not 
be regarded as property in the legal sense.230 The researcher differs from 
this conclusion. Could it not rather be said that a different interpretation 
was given to ‘property’ by the court to that as defined in Stander.231 
Namely that property would not require an amount to be capable of being 
turned into money by the receiver as required by Stander. Thus on this 
interpretation, the court still regarded the interest free loan as property in 
the legal sense when it found it to constitute an amount. There was no 
detracting from the legal meaning but rather a different interpretation of the 
legal meaning. 
The second case which Jansen van Rensburg refers to is that of 
Ackermans.232 As already discussed in 4.2.8, the case deals with the 
question whether the foregoing by the seller of the full purchase price in 
exchange for the acceptance of contingent liabilities by the purchaser 
could be regarded as expenditure actually incurred. 
Counsel for the taxpayer argued that expenditure includes all ‘actual, 
quantifiable diminutions or prejudicial effects suffered by the taxpayer’s 
patrimony’. He continued in stating that it was not limited to the incurrence 
of legal obligations, but rather embodied a commercial or economic 
                                            
227 Jansen Van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 71. 
228 Brummeria Renaissance supra note 143.   
229 Latagan v CIR 1926 CPD 203 at 208-9. 
230 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 72. 
231 Stander supra note 142. 
232 Ackermans supra note 145. 
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concept in contrast to strict legal liability. This is similar to the idea of 
notional expenditure supported by Ger. 
The supreme held that ‘”Expenditure incurred” meant the undertaking of 
an obligation to pay or – which amounted to the same thing – the actual 
incurral of a liability.’233 The seller did not incur expenditure in fact or law 
by accepting a lesser purchase price than he would have been entitled to 
had he not transferred the contingent liabilities to the purchaser.234  
Jansen van Rensburg argues that this case provides authority by 
implication for holding that where a taxpayer is giving up the opportunity to 
earn money, no asset would be expended and no expenditure would 
exist.235 A diminution of an asset in the strict legal sense is required.  
The researcher agrees that this is a possible implication of Ackermans, but 
sight should not be lost of the context within which the case was decided.  
Ackermans firstly preceded Labat, and as such the court did not address 
‘expenditure’ in isolation as a distinct requirement apart from ‘actually 
incurred’. The court rather addressed the whole phrase. The court found 
that no obligation was incurred by Ackermans, which as we saw in chapter 
4 is the requirement for ‘actually incurred’. This was traditionally pre-Labat 
the test to determine whether expenditure was actually incurred.  
Consequently one cannot deduce with certainty that the court regarded 
this right forgone as not constituting expenditure. It might be that they 
merely rejected it on the grounds that it did not create an unconditional 
obligation in the legal or factual sense. Nevertheless, it serves as an 
illustration of the courts general unwillingness to allow a deduction for 
foregoing the opportunity to earn monetary amounts. 
 
 
5.3.5 Concluding remarks 
                                            
233 Ibid para 8. 
234 Ibid para 11. 
235 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 72. 
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Labat is the first case in which the Supreme Court attempts to define 
expenditure. The researcher agrees with Jansen van Rensburg that the 
court although providing an acceptable definition, failed to thoroughly 
define the individual building blocks of this definition. One of these is the 
term ‘asset’. No certainty is provided by case law as to what meaning 
should be attributable.  
On considering all the above authorities, it would seem that there is 
general sense that commercial expediency requires that expenditure not 
be restricted to a mere diminution of assets in the strict legal sense, but 
rather be extended to any economic sacrifices. The discussion however 
has also shown that our courts have been reluctant to allow the deduction 
for the loss of income earning possibilities. The researcher accordingly 
contends that it would be highly unlikely to succeed on the right forgone 
argument in future. A diminution as assets in the legal sense would be 
required on the basis of Labat. 
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5.4 Set-off as a possible method of payment 
5.4.1 The Argument 
This argument was first raised by Meyerowitz, writing on share-based 
payments.236 He based his argument on the old companies act 
requirements as regards the issue of shares.237 Namely shares could not 
be issued at less than par value, and only once consideration had been 
received in full. On these principles the author held that where a company 
receives assets or services in place of cash, the company has by set-off 
expended an amount equal to the nominal value of the shares. He 
supports his argument with approval of the English authorities as we have 
previously discussed in paragraph 2.2.2.   
Meyerowitz concludes in linking this set-off argument to that of an 
‘economic equivalence contention’. The effect of share-based payments 
(as found in Labat) is the same to the situation had the company first paid 
for the services/assets, and then the opposite party had applied these 
funds in acquiring the shares.  This economic equivalence argument was 
rejected by Labat.238 Our courts give effect to the transaction as entered 
into on its legal nature, and not on the basis of what could have been 
structured differently using a different legal form to achieve the same 
economic consequences.239 
5.4.2 Theoretical background 
Set-off occurs where two parties have claims against each other. Where 
the requirements for set-off are met, the claims can be extinguished 
against each other. The following four requirements need to be complied 
with for set-off to occur.240  
i) The debts must exist between the same two parties acting in the same 
capacity. ii) The debts must be of the same type or nature. iii) Both debts 
                                            
236 DM op cit note 104 at 87.   
237 See ss81, 82 and 92 of the old companies act. See also the discussion on shares in 
section 1.3 where the equivalent sections in the new act are addressed. 
238 Labat supra note 8 par 15.  
239 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 62. 
240 D Hutchison (ed), CJ Pretorius (ed) & J Du Plessis et al Kontraktereg in Suid-Afrika 
(2010) at 398-399. 
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must be enforceable. The debts should not be subject to any conditions, 
time clauses or a possible defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus. 
This defence entails that the party from which performance is claimed, can 
object on the basis that the opposite party has not performed his part of 
the contract (defeasible duty to perform).241 iv) Both debts should be liquid 
in nature. This entails that the debt should be capable of easy and speedy 
proof. 
For purposes of our discussion as regards share-based and service based 
payments, we will focus on (ii) and (iii). 
5.4.3 Application on the facts of Labat and others.  
If one takes the Labat facts as a starting point, it is clear that set-off would 
not be possible, as the debts are not similar. Labat had an obligation to 
issue shares, whereas the opposing party had an obligation to pay a cash 
amount. This was confirmed by Harms AP stating: ‘How one can set-off 
shares against money was not explained.’242 
The question however becomes a bit more complicated if we tweak the 
facts somewhat. If we assume that the shares were issued for 
consideration in cash, and the trademark/asset was sold for cash. Could it 
be argued that the cash amounts from these two transactions can be set-
off against each other?   
De Cock in rejecting the possibility looks at the requirement that shares be 
fully paid up before they can be issued.243 He refers to Etkind and Others v 
Hicor Trading Limited and another, where the court held that consideration 
(cash or otherwise) should be received on or prior to shares being 
issued.244 This leads him to conclude that a share subscription agreement 
creates a bilateral contract between the parties.245 Thus the obligations 
created would be reciprocal, and performance of one would be conditional 
upon performance of the other. This creates a ‘catch 22’ situation in which 
the company cannot issue its shares prior to payment being received, but 
                                            
241 Ibid at 329. 
242 Labat supra note 8 para 15. 
243 De Cock op cit note 133. 
244 Etkind supra note 30. 
245 De Cock op cit note 133 at 56-57. 
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conversely the allottee can withhold payment until shares are issued in 
terms of the exceptio. Thus the author concludes that the third 
requirement for set-off is not met. 
The researcher contends that De Cock’s argument could be overcome by 
the application of s40(5) of the new Companies Act. This section creates 
the possibility for a subscription agreement which provides for payment at 
a future date. The company is obligated to issue the shares immediately, 
but the shares are held in trust by a third party until such stage as the 
subscriber has paid up.246 In this scenario the subscriber would not be 
able to avail himself on the exceptio, as the shares have already been 
issued. There is thus an indefeasible duty to perform on the subscriber’s 
part and the debts are both cash and thus of the same type. The 
requirements for set-off are consequently met.  
The researcher thus contends that set-off would be possible in certain 
defined cases, namely where the shares are issued for consideration in 
cash. Further the shares although not paid up, need to be issued as 
provided for in terms of s40(5). If these conditions are present, the cash 
debts of the issuing company (as regards the asset/service acquired) can 
be set-off against the subscription debt due by the allottee.    
Jansen Van Rensburg supports this argument in stating that set-off would 
be possible in the case where the contract created a duty on the company 
to pay the counter party in cash, and the counter party incurred an 
obligation to subscribe for the shares in cash.247 In this scenario, the cash 
amounts can be set-off without any cash being exchanged.  
 
  
 
 
 
                                            
246 Section 40(5)(b)(ii) of act 71 of 2008. 
247 Jansen van Rensburg op cit note 48 at 61. 
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5.5 Debt reduction and the possibility of recoupment, reduction in 
assessed losses and capital gains248 
5.5.1 The Argument 
One of the criticisms raised by Marais against Labat, was the anomaly it 
created when initial payment for an asset/share was agreed in cash, but in 
a subsequent year the parties agreed that consideration would take the 
form of shares. He states: ‘…does an expense, previously recognised, like 
Proteus or werewolves at the sight of the full moon, suddenly transmute 
into something else?’249 
On the basis of our previous discussion on Labat in chapter three, we 
have seen that where the parties in year one agree that payment would 
take the form of cash, expenditure would be actually incurred, as there 
exists an unconditional obligation of which the hypothetical discharge 
would require an diminution of assets. What happens when the parties 
now, in year two agree on payment by share issue? 
It has been argued that Marais’ anomaly could possibly be addressed by 
the application of ss8(4)(m), 20(1)(a)(ii) and para12(5) of the eight 
schedule.250 Namely that instead of changing character from expenditure 
to non-expenditure, one could rather work with recoupment, reductions in 
assessed losses or capital gains, where an initial expenditure is 
discharged by share issue in a later year. These provisions have however 
all been removed by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 2012.251  
What follows is a review of these old provisions and the arguments based 
thereon. The purpose being to consider their relevance vis a vis share-
based payments and whether they provided an answer to Marais’ 
anomaly. Additionally these provisions applied when Labat was 
considered. Thereafter the researcher will look at the new position as 
amended and consider in what way these have changed the old position 
and the impact, if any these had on share-based payments. 
                                            
248 CIR v Datakor Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 1050 (SCA).  
249 Marais op cit note 94 at 5. 
250 See Schoon op cit note 118 at 48-56; De Cock op cit note 133 at 51-57. 
251 See s9(1)(c), s37(1) and s107(1)(c) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 22 of 2012. 
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5.5.2 Recoupment in terms of the old s8(4)(m)? 
Section 8(4)(m)(i) provided as follows”  
‘Subject to section 20, where as a result of…variation of an agreement 
or due to…waiver or release of a claim for payment, any person was 
during any year…relieved…from the obligation to make payment of any 
expenditure actually incurred; (iii) such expenditure or any 
allowance…was in the current or any previous year of assessment 
allowed as a deduction…such person shall…be deemed to have 
recovered or recouped an amount equal to the amount of the obligation 
from which the person was so relieved…’ 
It should be noted that this section finds application against the backdrop 
of s20(1)(a)(ii) which provides for reduction in assessed losses in the case 
of benefits received from concessions/compromises with creditors. Where 
an assessed loss exists, this will first be extinguished before s(8)(4) will 
find application. It is further more noted that recoupment is only possible 
where the initial obligation was allowed as deductible expenditure.  
De Cock considers s8(4)(m) in the context of share-based payment for 
services rendered.252 The following example is used: A renders services to 
B, and they agree that B will pay in cash. In year two, the parties agree 
that B will rather issue shares to A to extinguish the debt. The author 
contends that this is a situation where the initial agreement is amended by 
a second agreement in year two. This second agreement although 
creating an obligation to issue shares, relieves B of the initial obligation to 
pay cash (release from claim for payment).253 This in turn triggers s8(4)(m) 
and thus a recoupment.  
Whether this obligation to issue shares still constitutes ‘payment’ as 
defined is uncertain, as the act does not define payment for purposes of 
the section. Dictionary definitions provide limited assistance as the 
following illustrates.  
Payment: ‘the action or process of paying someone or something or of 
being paid’254 ; ‘Performance of an obligation by the delivery of money or 
                                            
252 De cock op cit note 133 at 52. 
253 Ibid at 54. 
254 Oxford dictionary op cit note 59. 
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some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of the 
obligation.’255  
It is thus uncertain whether this amended form of consideration in the form 
of shares necessarily relieves B of payment, in the sense required by 
s8(4)(m). The second agreement could be construed as merely amending 
the form of payment, but not releasing B from his payment obligations.  
De Cock in construing payment in a wide sense, states that payment could 
hypothetically occur by way of set-off, in which case recoupment would not 
be applicable. De Cock in considering the possibility finds that set-off 
would not be possible in these circumstances as it does not meet the 
requirements for set-off.256 Our previous discussion at 5.4 supra has 
however shown the contrary in certain defined circumstances. The 
researcher thus contends that recoupment in our example above can be 
avoided by way of set-off.  
Nevertheless there is a sense of satisfaction to be found in De Cock’s 
argument as it provides a solution to the anomaly raised by Marais. If we 
accept that s8(4)(m) applies, the company would be regarded as 
recouping a taxable amount in year two equal to the expenditure it claimed 
in year one, without need for changing the character of the expenditure 
incurred in year one.  
Schoon contends that s8(4)(m) could have been applied to the facts of 
Labat in which case Labat would have been subjected to a recoupment in 
the year in which relief was granted to it (namely to pay in shares).257 It 
should be noted that the authors opinion was based on the high court 
case, where Sapire AJ held, that the obligation to issue shares constituted 
expenditure actually incurred, despite the fact that no diminution in assets 
occurred.258 The mere incurrence of an obligation was sufficient.   
The researcher contends that the facts of Labat do not necessarily create 
an opportunity for s8(4)(m) recoupment. As seen above what is required 
                                            
255 BA Garner (ed), T Jackson & J Newman Black’s Law dictionary 8 ed (2004) at 1165. 
256 See the discussion on set-off at 5.4. 
257 Schoon op cit note 118 at 55.  
258 CSARS v Labat Africa Ltd supra note 4. 
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for the application of s8(4)(m) is relief from an obligation to pay. On the 
facts of Labat the crucial issue was exactly the lack of such an obligation. 
Labat never incurred an obligation to pay cash, but rather to issue shares. 
There was thus never an obligation to pay which could be said to have 
been reduced. The high court held that the obligation to issue shares 
amounted to expenditure, despite not diminishing any assets. The court 
never regarded the facts as creating an initial obligation to pay in cash. In 
the subsequent appeal case, the court never acknowledged deductible 
expenditure.259 Thus the possibility of recoupment also not existed on 
Harms AP’s interpretation as one can only recoup something which has 
previously been allowed as a deduction.  
Furthermore, Labat dealt with the acquisition of a capital asset (trademark) 
on which capital allowances could be claimed provided the requirements 
of s11(gA) were met. This being the case, the researcher contends that 
debt incurred on the acquisition of the trademark and subsequently 
waivered, should rather be addressed by para 12(5) of the eight schedule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5.5.3 Section 20(1)(a)(ii) and the relevance of Datakor. 
Section 20(1)(a)(ii):  
‘the balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the amount or value 
of any benefit received…to a person resulting from a concession 
                                            
259 Labat supra note 8. 
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granted by or a compromise made with any creditor...whereby any 
liability owed…to such creditor has been reduced…to the extent that 
(aa) the amount advanced…used…to fund expenditure or an asset; and 
(bb) a deduction was allowed in terms of section 11…’    
 
Schoon argues on the basis of Datakor, that where a company discharges 
an initial cash obligation by subsequent share issue, this would amount to 
a compromise as required by the above mentioned section and constitutes 
a benefit to the company as the cash obligation is absolved.260 This 
argument is thus very similar to that of De Cock’s and it is contented that 
the Datakor interpretation on s20(1)(a)(ii) also provides guidance in 
considering the application of s8(4)(m).   
He states that by issuing shares, the company is extinguishing the 
creditor’s right to claim cash in exchange for shares.261 He continues in 
highlighting the difference between shares and a creditor’s claim. A 
creditor can enforce his claim at any time, whereas a shareholder only has 
a right to share in dividends and assets at liquidation.  
This is confirmed with reference to Jooste, stating as follows:  
‘Although the scheme alters the capital structure of the company, it 
enables the company to rid itself of its creditors who no longer have any 
claim against the company. Prior to the concession, the debtor 
company had to pay cash, subsequent thereto the debtor company no 
longer had an obligation to pay anything.’262  
 
Jooste concludes that this compromise gives the company a clearly 
defined benefit in the form of the reduced claims and should consequently 
reduce its assessed loss.263 
 
Further support is found in the Datakor case.264 The case concerned a 
company (Datakor Engineering) who was placed in liquidation. A scheme 
                                            
260 Schoon op cit note 118 at 48. 
261 Ibid at 49. 
262 RD Jooste ‘Schemes of Arrangement – a new development’ (1989) 28 Income Tax 
Reporter 7 at 10-11. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Datakor supra note 248. 
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of arrangement followed in terms of which the unpaid claims of the 
concurrent creditors were capitalised by the issue of redeemable 
preference shares to the creditors equal in value to the claims. The 
taxpayer then sought to carry forward its assessed loss of a previous year, 
to which the revenue service objected, arguing that s20(1)(a)(ii) applied. 
Harms JA, as he was then, finding as follows:  
‘…the mere substitution of a creditor’s claim with a share, even a 
redeemable preference share, amounted to a concession. An 
enforceable obligation was replaced with something of a completely 
different nature. In the case of debts, all the assets of the company 
were available to satisfy the claims of creditors whereas, in the case of 
redeemable preference shares, only the profits available for 
dividends…The right to redeem vested in the company…’265 
‘The concession by the creditors to waive the balance of their exigible 
claims against the taxpayer in return for a “right” of redemption of 
redeemable preference shares had of necessity to translate into a 
benefit to the taxpayer.’266        
 
It is contented by the researcher that this statement by Harms JA, should 
additionally inform the s8(4)(m) inquiry as addressed above. If share-
based payment in discharge of an original cash obligation would be 
sufficient in Harms AP opinion to trigger s20(1)(a), it would also suffice for 
s8(4)(m) recoupments.  
Schoon contends that the principles as enunciated in Datakor find equal 
application in the Labat case, and that had the court considered these 
principles, it might have come to a different conclusion. He argues as 
follows:  
‘…the vendor sold a trademark and agreed to accept shares in 
consideration. In terms of the agreement, the vendor/creditor gave up 
its right to demand payment in cash. This concession amounts to a 
compromise. As a result…purchasing company…in a better 
position…’267 
Although the above statement is sound in principle, it fails to recognise the 
true nature of the Labat facts. Schoon’s argument as to the applicability of 
                                            
265 Ibid para 11. 
266 Ibid para 15. 
267 Schoon op cit note 118 at 52. It should be noted that Schoon based his argument on 
the high court case, prior to Labat (SCA). 
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Datakor to the facts of Labat, would have held true, had the original 
agreement between Labat and the seller provided for cash consideration. 
The argument fails to recognise the fact that in the Labat case, the seller 
of the trademark never had an enforceable right to cash. As our previous 
discussion in chapter three has shown, there was no obligation incurred 
which the hypothetical discharge of, would require a diminution of assets 
(cash). It was this essential characteristic of the agreement that led Harms 
AP to concluding that there was no expenditure actually incurred on 
appeal. Had there been a right to claim cash, as Schoon contends is given 
up through compromise, expenditure would have been acknowledged on 
appeal.  
As Schoon considered the high court case we see further that Sapire J 
allowed the expenditure, but never accepted that there existed an initial 
obligation to pay in cash. He rather argued that a diminution of assets was 
not required.268  
A further clear indication that s20(1)(a) and its counterpart s8(4)(m) could 
not apply to the facts of Labat is the fact that both sections require that the 
amount be previously allowed as an deduction.269 In the Labat appeal 
court case, the obligation incurred to acquire the trademark was never 
allowed as a deduction in terms of section 11. Thus no recoupment could 
have taken place.  
The researcher contends that the findings of Harms AP in Labat accords 
with his previous findings in Datakor. Where an initial cash obligation is 
incurred, Harms AP would regard this as expenditure. Where the initial 
obligation takes the form of shares, no expenditure exists. It is only where 
an initial cash obligation turns into a share obligation, that recoupment 
would be expected, as the initial expenditure now needs to be recovered. 
This also provides an acceptable solution to Marais’ anomaly as 
addressed in the introduction to this argument.   
5.5.4 Paragraph 12(5) of the eight schedule. 
                                            
268 CSARS v Labat Africa Ltd supra note 4 at 77. 
269 See s8(4)(m)(iii) and s20(1)(a)(ii)(bb) of the act. 
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It should be noted that s20(1)(a)(ii) is limited in its application. As De 
Koker states in Silke, the section will only lead to a reduction in assessed 
loss, where the liabilities so reduced or extinguished, has arisen in the 
ordinary course of trade.270 This means that where the liability was 
incurred in the acquisition of capital assets, such a reduction could be 
dealt with by para 12(5) of the eight schedule, where neither s8(4)(m) or 
s20(1)(a)(ii) has been applied.  
In terms of para12(5), any reduction in capital debt is regarded as being 
acquired for no consideration and disposed of for a value equal to the 
reduction amount. Thus in effect a capital gain to the value of the 
reduction amount is realised.  
Thus on the reasoning of Schoon, where a capital debt is waived in 
exchange for shares, the issuing company will incur a capital gain to the 
value of the debt so waived.271  
It should be noted that para 12(5)(a) states: ‘…where a debt owed by a 
person to a creditor has been reduced or discharged by that creditor – (i) 
for no consideration…’. (emphasis added) 
The test applied by para12(5) is thus one of consideration. It would seem 
that Harms AP regards the issue of shares as constituting ‘consideration’ 
when he states in Labat: ‘…the issue of shares for the acquisition of 
assets amounted to “consideration” given by the company. This is hardly 
contentious.’272 It is submitted that para12(5) would thus not be applicable 
to the scenario of share-based payments in discharge of a capital debt. 
 
 
5.5.5 The position as amended?  
                                            
270 Silke op cit note 76 para 8.129. 
271 Schoon op cit note 118 at 56. 
272 Labat supra note 8 para 10. 
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Given the recent financial crisis and the large number of local companies 
facing financial distress, the government regards the provision of relief to 
these companies as essential to local economic recovery and stability.273 
Legislature’s concern is visible in the new companies act. The act provides 
a lifejacket for companies in financial distress in the form of business 
rescue proceedings.274 Section 155 makes express provision for 
compromises between a company and its creditors. The problem is that 
the current tax system as embodied by the above mentioned provisions 
impedes this recovery process.275 Where a party receives the benefit of 
debt relief, the economic benefit is effectively undermined by the additional 
tax imposed.276 Consequently all three the above addressed provisions 
have been removed. The reduction or cancellation of debt is now 
governed by s19 as read with para 12A of the eight schedule. These 
provisions apply to all tax years starting on or after 1 January 2013.277  
 
Section 19 
Section 19(2): ‘this section applies where a debt that is owed by a 
person is reduced by any amount and – (a) the amount of that debt was 
used, directly or indirectly, to fund any expenditure in respect of which a 
deduction or allowance was granted…and (b) the amount of that 
reduction exceeds any amount applied by that person as consideration 
for the reduction (reduction amount).’ (emphasis added) 
Paragraph 12A of the eight schedule. 
 ‘this paragraph applies where a debt that is owed by a person is 
reduced by any amount and- (a) the amount of that debt was used 
directly or indirectly, to fund any expenditure- (i) other than expenditure 
in respect of which a deduction or allowance was granted in terms of 
this act; or (ii) incurred in acquisition…of an allowance asset; and (b) 
the amount of that reduction exceeds any amount applied by that 
person as consideration for that reduction.’  (emphasis added) 
 
                                            
273 Explanatory Memorandum to 2012 act , at 44.   
274 Chapter 6 of the companies act 71 of 2008. 
275 Section 8(4)(m), s20(1)(a) and para12(5) of the eight schedule.  
276 Explanatory Memorandum op cit note 43 at 44.  
277 Section 36(2) and s108(2) of Act 22 of 2012.  
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The two provisions read together create a scheme in which there can be 
distinguished between four types of debt, each with its own rules in the 
case of debt reduction. 
i) Trading Stock (not disposed of) debt: The reduction amount should 
firstly reduce any s11(a) or s22(1)-(2) deduction in respect of the trading 
stock in the tax year.278 Should the reduction amount exceed this, the 
excess should be regarded as a recoupment in terms of s8(4)(a).279 
ii) Expenditure allowed as a deduction/allowance other than (a) 
expenditure incurred in the acquisition of trading stock not disposed of; (b) 
expenditure incurred in acquisition of allowance asset: Reduction amount 
be deemed to be recouped to the extent that a deduction/allowance was 
granted.280 
iii) Expenditure incurred in the acquisition/creation/improvement of an 
allowance asset: The reduction amount will firstly reduce the expenditure 
for purposes of para20 of the eight schedule (base cost reduction).281 
Should the reduction amount exceed the base cost, the excess will be 
regarded as an recoupment in terms of s8(4)(a).282   
iv) Expenditure incurred in the acquisition/creation/improvement of an 
asset (other than an allowance asset): Where the asset is still held, the 
reduction amount will first be used to reduce the base cost expenditure for 
purposes of para20.283 The excess reduction amount will be applied in 
reducing the assessed capital loss.284 Where the asset is no longer held, 
the whole reduction amount will be used to reduce the assessed capital 
loss. 
The new provisions expressly exclude certain debt reductions. These 
include reductions as part of a bequest from an estate, reductions that 
                                            
278 Section 19(3)(b). 
279 Section 19(4)(c). 
280 Section 19(5). 
281 Paragraph 12A(3)(b). 
282 Section 19(6)(b)(ii). 
283 Paragraph 12A(3)(b). 
284 Paragraph 12A(4)(b). 
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constitute a donation and finally reductions that form a disguised salary 
(employer-employee relationship).285 
 
5.5.6 Concluding remarks 
The new scheme as embodied by the above provisions looks to be more 
attractive to taxpayers subjected to debt reductions. This can be seen from 
the additional exclusions, but also from the change in approach in 
comparison to the old sections. Recoupments can now be reduced by 
firstly diminishing them against other expenditure and base cost whereas 
previously the whole reduction amount was merely regarded as 
constituting either a capital gain or revenue recoupment. This would seem 
to be in accordance with government’s aims in supporting economic 
recovery and stability.  
However a further important consideration brought about by the new 
amendments should be noted. The old provisions phrased the reduction 
amount as a ‘reduction/relief from liability/obligation to make payment’. It 
was argued that these provisions could be construed as including share-
based payments of initial cash obligations in the sphere of debt 
reduction.286 Namely where shares are issued in discharging a cash debt, 
the issuing company receives relief from the obligation to make payment. 
The new provisions however define the reduction amount as follows: 
‘…means a y amount by which that debt is reduced less any amount 
applied by that person as consideration for that reduction.’287 As our 
previous discussion has shown, Harms AP regarded share-based 
payments as constituting consideration.288 This position is supported by 
English case law as discussed in 3.3 supra. 
It is consequently submitted by the researcher, that where a company 
discharges an initial cash debt by the issue of shares, this would not be 
                                            
285 Section 19(8) and para12A(6)(a)-(c) of the eight schedule. 
286 See De cock op cit note 133, Schoon op cit note 118 as read with Datakor supra note 
248. 
287 Section 19(1) and para12A(1) of the eight schedule: ‘reduction amount’ as defined. 
288 Labat supra note 8 para 10. 
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regarded as a debt reduction as conveyed by s19 and para12A as the 
company still gives ‘consideration’ for the reduction. Thus no recoupment, 
reduction in assessed loss or capital gain will arise.  
This interpretation would also be in accordance with SARS’ aims of 
economic recovery and stability by providing tax relief to financially 
distressed companies. The conversion of debt to equity is a common 
practice involved in business rescue and by regarding this as a 
recoupment; SARS would once again be impeding the workings of chapter 
six of the new companies act.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion  
6.1 In summary 
The primary aim of this study was to determine the meaning of 
‘expenditure actually incurred’ as contained in the act and whether share-
based payments could be regarded as such. Once this had been 
ascertained, the study would then consider the appropriateness of this 
meaning by considering the most pertinent arguments on the topic.    
6.1.1 Relevance of ‘expenditure actually incurred’ 
The researcher found that the phrase finds application in a variety of 
sections throughout the act, and that its true meaning is thus of 
considerable importance. As regards to share-based payments, the 
meaning still remains relevant where s40CA and s11(lA) do not find 
application. 
6.1.2 The meaning of expenditure 
The study found that ‘expenditure’ adds the requirement of a diminution or 
at least a movement of assets post Labat. The mere incurrence of an 
obligation would not be regarded as expenditure. ‘Expenditure’ effectively 
requires that the nature of the obligation be of such a nature that its 
discharge would lead to a movement of assets.  
6.1.3 The meaning of actually incurred 
The study found that the existing position as regards ‘actually incurred’ 
remains intact post Labat. Thus what is required is the incurrence of an 
unconditional obligation. Expenditure cannot be actually incurred before 
such an obligation exists. Labat merely circumscribes the nature of the 
obligation incurred, namely that its discharge would require a movement of 
assets. There is no requirement post-Labat that the obligation should 
already be paid.   
6.1.4 Diminution/movement of assets or a mere obligation 
The study found both primary and secondary sources on this question 
prior to Labat, to be contradictory. One group supporting the argument that 
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a mere obligation should suffice, relying on ‘actually incurred’ case law.  
The other group arguing for a diminution of assets at the hand of a strict 
literal approach. The researcher contends that Labat is correct in requiring 
that expenditure requires something apart from the mere incurrence of an 
obligation as required by ‘actually incurred’.  
The researcher however disagrees with Labat’s interpretation given to 
‘expenditure’ which requires a movement of assets. The researcher 
contends that expenditure should rather be defined on the basis of what 
gives rise to the obligation or movement of assets. The fact that the 
expenditure is incurred by way of either an increase in liability or reduction 
in assets is irrelevant; these are merely two sides of the same coin.  
6.1.5 Right forgone Argument 
The study showed that where a company issues shares as fully paid up, it 
does not part with an asset in the legal sense. At most what is given up is 
a spes, which is not regarded as enforceable in law. As regards the 
argument that asset diminution for purposes of expenditure should be 
interpreted in a broader manner than the strict legal sense to include any 
economic sacrifices, such an argument is found to be unlikely considering 
recent case law. It is concluded that a diminution of assets in the legal 
sense is required and that share-based payments do not constitute such. 
6.1.6 Set-off 
It is found that set-off as a possible method payment which would 
constitute expenditure actually incurred, would only be possible in the 
case where the shares are initially issued for cash in terms of s40(5) of the 
new companies act. In such circumstances the cash debts can be set-off 
against each other.  
 
6.1.7 Debt reduction where shares are issued to settle cash debt? 
The study has found that where shares are issued in discharge of an initial 
cash debt, the old s8(4)(m) and s20(1)(a)(ii) could possibly apply on the 
reading of the Datakor case. The issuing company could consequently be 
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subject to recoupment and reductions in assessed loss.  It was further 
contended that these sections should not have found application in the 
case of Labat, as no expenditure was actually incurred. Finally the impact 
of the new Taxation Laws Amendment Act was considered. It was found 
that the new provisions regulating debt reduction would no longer 
encompass share-based payments of previous cash debts under its 
scope.     
6.2 Share-based payments: The path going forward and practical 
alternatives to the problem  
The position post-Labat is that share-based payments would not be 
regarded as expenditure actually incurred. Where the shares are issued in 
the acquisition of assets, one could apply s40CA in which case 
expenditure would be deemed to have been incurred equal to market 
value of the shares issued. Where s40CA however does not apply, 
alternative methods need to be followed to insure a deduction.   
i) Issuing shares for cash and applying the proceeds towards the relevant 
expense.  
This would be the safest route to follow. There exists a clear money trail 
which would constitute the required diminution/movement of assets 
upon incurrence of the expenditure. 
ii) Buy the services/asset on credit, and later settle the obligation by 
issuing shares. 
This option would be regarded as expenditure in terms of Labat, as it 
involves the incurrence of an initial obligation which the hypothetical 
settlement of would require a movement of assets (cash). The risk 
associated with taking this route is that SARS could possibly argue 
substance over form given cash never flows.289 Another risk is the 
possibility of SARS arguing debt reduction on the basis of Datakor, and 
arguing for recoupment in terms of s19 of the act. The researcher 
however argues this would not be possible on a reading of s19. 
Alternatively the issuing company can issue the shares for 
                                            
289 Brincker op cit note 2 at p-4. 
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consideration in cash, and set-off this right to claim cash against its 
cash obligation originally incurred. 
 
iii) Issue the shares directly as consideration for services/asset, thus no 
cash obligation even arises.  
 This is similar to the facts of Labat. No expenditure would be incurred, 
unless s40CA applies. 
iv) Company pays cash as consideration and seller has option to acquire 
shares in company. 
This is once again a scenario where the company clearly departs with 
an asset at acquisition and expenditure would be regarded to have 
been incurred. 
v) Company pays cash as consideration and seller is obligated to use 
funds to acquire shares in said company. 
This would constitute expenditure actually incurred as a diminution of 
assets occurs. This alternative poses some risk as SARS could possibly 
argue substance over form. To prevent such a situation, it is important 
that the cash amount actually flows through and that a time delay exists 
between receipt of the cash by the seller and subsequent share 
subscription.290 What should be clear is an intention to transfer and 
retransfer the cash.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
290 Ibid. 
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